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Abstract
This study exploits the reduction of weekly working hours from 48 to 45 occured
in Chile in January 2005. We use this pure and exogenous policy change to identify
the employment e¤ects of such a policy. Our main contribution is that we overcome
the problems of previous studies such as: selection between hours and employment, lack
of identication strategy due to the joint implementation of policies and lack of crucial
variables (like hourly wages and usual hours). Our results suggest no signicant e¤ects
of a reduction of standard hours on employment transitions and a signicant e¤ect on
hourly wages (i.e. wage compensation). These results are robust to several specications.
1 Introduction
Several countries like France, Germany, Portugal, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Italy, United
Kingdom among others have implemented and (or) discussed policies to reduce (maximum)
standard working hours.1 Some of them due to the European Working Time Directive (1993)
I am grateful to Wiji Arulampalam and Mark Stewart for their helpful comments and support. Also I would
like to thank Jan van Ours, Jennifer Smith, Andrés Carvajal and Andrea Salvatori for many useful discussions,
comments and suggestions. This study has been done using the EPS Panel. The author acknowledges Subsec-
retaria de Prevision Social for provide access to the data. All the results and mistakes of this study are my own
responsability and do not compromise the Subsecretaria.
1The maximum standard working hours are dene as the maximum number of hours above which employers
have to pay overtime. For simplicity, we follow the convention in the literature and we will refer to the maximum
standard working hours as standard hours, "basic hours" or "normal hours". This may be misleading since
it could be the case that, because of contractual characteristics, some employees are paid overtime even when
they work less than the maximum number of standard hours. We will return to this point later, but for the
moment we rule out this case.
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but others have made earlier reductions mainly to tackle high rates of unemployment. The
rationale for this policy is that, for a given output, a reduction of standard hours will decrease
the total usual (average) hours worked by employees and therefore it will be necessary to hire
new workers. However, when rms use overtime, a reduction of standard hours will increase
the relative marginal cost of employment relative to the marginal cost of hours leading to a
negative e¤ect on employment and an increase in overtime hours. Therefore the demand for
hours by rms, before the reduction of standard hours, will be crucial for the nal e¤ect on
employment (Calmfors and Hoel 1988 and Hamermesh 1993, among others).
Furthermore, the overall e¤ect of the reduction of standard hours on employment will also
hinge on the reaction of monthly earnings. If monthly earnings remain constant and usual hours
decrease due to the reduction of standard hours then hourly wages will increase. Firms will
then substitute capital for labour with a negative e¤ect on employment and usual hours (Hunt
1999). Moreover, if rms adjust the level of output, there will be an additional negative scale
e¤ect to be added to the previous e¤ects. Given this ambiguity in the theoretical predictions,
the e¤ect of a reduction of working hours on employment remains an empirical question.
The literature has pointed out that a change in standard hours may also a¤ect the com-
position (mix) of employment.2 In particular, Hart (2004) shows that a reduction of standard
hours increases the relative cost of full-time workers, inducing rms to increase the share of
part-time workers which might attenuate the substitution towards hours.
Unfortunately there are few studies with micro-econometric evidence about the e¤ect of
working hours on employment, almost all of them in Europe (see Hunt 1999, Steiner and Peters
2000 among others) and none for developing countries. Furthermore, the empirical evidence
presents some caveats. The rst one is that most of the studies analize work sharing policies
derived from collective bargains, which induce them to use instruments to control for endogene-
ity of standard hours and therefore rely on the validity of the instrument. Fewer studies have
used exogenous changes in regulation to asses the impact of reductions of standard hours on
employment (Crepón and Kramarz 2002 and Chemin and Wasmer 2009); The problem is that
even those studies are unable to identify the nete¤ect3 of the policy due to lack of data or
negligible magnitude of the policy change. A third problem of previous literature is that, in
general, reductions of standard hours are jointly implemented with other policies like higher
exibility (e.g. Portugal) andnor nancial incentives (e.g. France) and therefore it is di¢ cult
to isolate the pure e¤ect of the reduction of standard hours on employment. Also, there is no
2Share of part-time workers on total employment of the rm.
3"Net" refers to the direct e¤ect of the reduction of working hours once controlled for the indirect e¤ect of
wages.
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direct micro-econometric evidence about the e¤ects of reductions on standard working hours on
mix of employment, which can a¤ect the substitution between working hours and employment.
This study exploits an exogenous variation of standard hours given by a change in Chilean
regulation about maximum standard hours per week to study the e¤ect on employment tran-
sitions for those people a¤ected by the policy. Specically, in September of 2001 the Chilean
Parliament approved a labour reform which included a compulsory reduction of the maximum
standard hours from 48 to 45 hours per week.4 The whole reform took place in December 2001
except the reduction of hours which (compulsorily) began on the rst of January of 2005. This
separation of the reduction of standard hours from the rest of the reform gives us a pure policy
change on working hours not present in other studies.5
This study uses the EPS Panel (Encuesta de Proteccion Social) , which includes information
about weekly usual (average) hours, monthly earnings, employment and type of contract (among
others) before and after the change in policy. Hence, we extend the analysis of Crepón and
Kramarz (2002), since they do not have data on usual hours and hourly wages before the policy
change. Limitations that we do not have.6 Similarly to the French case, this study does not
analyze the overall e¤ect on employment, instead it focuses on those employees a¤ected by the
reduction of standard hours (i.e. study the excess of employment destruction and not net job
destruction).7 Specically, this study uses a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach (DID) to study
whether workers a¤ected by the reduction of working hours (i.e. employees who worked 46-48
hours before the policy change) lost their jobs more often than those not a¤ected by the policy.8
Also we extend the analysis to those who were working overtime (i.e. those who worked 49-60
hours).
This study is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the implications derived from theo-
retical literature. Section 3 presents empirical evidence at the macro and micro level. Section
4 summarizes the institutional framework of the policy change in Chile. Section 5, presents
4One of the arguments stated for the reduction of standard hours was the high level of unemployment in
Chile due to the e¤ects of the Asian Crisis (1998-2000) and the low productivity of Chilean workers due to long
working hours. Other reasons were the negative e¤ects on health and family (social) life of long working hours.
Dirección del Trabajo (Undersecretaryship of labour), Temas Laborales No11 (2002).
5Although it introduces some complications. We will refer extensively to this in section 5.
6These variables are crucial since as Kramarz et al (2008) pointed out . . . .the impact of a compulsory
reduction in working hours on employment hinges on the reaction of wages.
7Although, Crepón and Kramarz show that the almost 8% excess of destruction found for low wage workers
in their study is consistent with a net job destruction of around 2% which gives an elasticity of employment to
labour costs just below -1, which is in line with french empirical evidence. Therefore, the excess job destruction
seems to have some impact on net job destruction.
8Because they were working below the new standard (i.e. those who worked 44-45 hours before the change
in policy).
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the description of the dataset and the key variables. Section 6, introduces the identication
strategy, the methodology we use to evaluate the e¤ect of the policy and the results. Section
7, presents the sensitivity analysis and section 8 conludes.
2 Theoretical Evidence: labour demand and working
hours
Theoretical literature on labour demand recognizes the distinction between hours of work and
number of workers (employment). The main reason for this is that if hours and workers were
perfectly substitutable then companies would choose the amount of hours without taking into
account the manner in which those hours were divided up among its workers. This scenario
is only true if the productivity of an hour of work and the rate of utilization of capital do
not depend on the average individual length of time worked. On the one hand, the former
case is unlikely due to the existence of setup costs which makes that worker productivity
has increasing returns for small values of hours worked and beyond a threshold fatigue will
start a¤ecting workersproductivity and then productivity will have decreasing returns. On
the other hand, the latter case is also unlikely since in order to keep the rate of utilization
of capital independent of the hours of work we need to assume that companies adjust their
production process with every change in working hours.
Furthermore, the distinction between hours of work and employment becomes more impor-
tant since the cost of labour is not a linear function of its duration. There are at least two
reasons for this: rstly, there are some costs (like cost of hiring and ring, training cost and
certain social security contributions) that do not depend on how many hours people actually
work. Secondly, it is common to nd regulations in di¤erent countries that specify the maxi-
mum standard hours of work and the overtime hours. Overtime hours are usually remunerated
at a higher rate than the standard hour (the cost of overtime hours could also be non linear
with respect to its duration like in France and Portugal). Therefore, there will be a di¤erence
between the costs arising from an increase in the number of workers from the one that arise
from a change in working hours per worker.
The theoretical literature which analyze the e¤ect of reducing working hours on employment
started with Rosen (1968) and then it were extended by Ehrenberg (1971) and Calmfors and
Hoel (1988) among others. They focus on the demand side of the labour market and implicitly
assume that wages are given and that labour is homogenous. The implications of these earlier
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literature can be easily derived from Calmfors and Hoel (1988) version of the labour demand
model which assumes that we have a rm that minimize costs given a particular level of output:
Min CN subject to F [G (h)N; lk]  Y (1)
C =
(
[f + w0T + w1 (h  T )] if h > T
[f + w0h] if h  T
)
(2)
Where: C is the cost per worker, w0 is the wage for a basic (standard) hour of work,
N represents the number of workers (employment), h is the average (usual) individual hours
worked, Y = output, T = standard workweek9, w1 is the overtime wage = w0 (1+) where 
is the overtime premium (assumed to be constant), f = positive scalar that represents those
costs which do not depend on hours of work (i.e. cost of hire and re, training costs , among
others)10, K = l k = capital services where l = operating time (i.e. the number of hours the
plants is in operation) and k = capital stock (assumed to be given)11. It is assumed that F is
a well behaved concave production function.
Calmfors and Hoel (1988) also work with labour services (L=labour services=G(h)N=g(h)hN)
instead of working hours, hence we dene G(h) as a function which describes the relation be-
tween productivity of each worker and his working time in the production of labour services.
Without this function G (i.e. L=hN), workersproductivity would be independent of hours.
By the same argument, g(h) = G(h)/h = is the average productivity per hour of each worker.
It is also assumed that due to setup costs the marginal productivity of an hour of work
is positive, gh>0 (i.e. increasing returns), for small values of h and because beyond certain
threshold (h) fatigue will set in, it is assumed that gh<0 (i.e. decreasing returns) for large
values of h. We also assume that we are in this latter region, which implies that the elasticity
9By assumption it will be imposed by law or by central bargaining, which means that it will be exogenous.
10These xed costs depends on the institutional environment and on the unemployment rate. For example:
xed costs should be higher in those countries with higher job protection and when the rate of unemployment
is low since it takes more time to nd unemployed workers.
11The productivity of capital is thus assumed to be independent of the operating time. Calforms and Hoel
(1988) relax this assumption at the end of their paper by assuming that operating time of capital is proportional
to hours. The main change under this setting is that working time will not be scale independent anymore which
generates more ambiguous cases.
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of labour services with respect to working time is smaller than one. Finally it is assumed that
marginal productivity is declining (i.e. Ghh<0 for h>h).12
Equation (2) represents labour costs and implies that labour demand (i.e. number of workers
employed and hours worked) should depend on the relative magnitudes of the variable costs (w0,
T and ) versus xed costs (f). Hence, a relative increase in variable costs (or a relative fall of
xed costs) should increase employment and decrease hours. This implies that the demand for
hours and the demand for workers may vary in opposite directions.This Keynesian framework
was usually in mind when cuttings in working hours were rst proposed, since under this setting
it might be possible, under certain conditions, to have an increment on employment by cutting
working hours. Nevertheless, with this framework we can have di¤erent equilibriums depending
on the situation of the rm before the reduction in working hours. To see this we minimize (1)
keeping l, k and Y xed while C is giving by (2) and w1 is a constant. Thus, the rst order
conditions are:
w0
C
=
Gh
G
for h < T (3)
w1
C
=
Gh
G
for h > T (4)
w0
C
=
Gh
G
=
w1
C
for h = T (5)
Where (3) and (4) are interior solutions and (5) is a corner solution. Hence the consequence
of the reduction in working time will depend on the starting situation of the rm:
Case A: Nw0
C
= NGh
G
, where Nw0 is the marginal factor cost for hours when actual time
(h) is below the standard working time (T ). NGh is the marginal product of hours and G is
the marginal product of employment in the production of labour services. In this case a small
reduction in T will not have e¤ect. This is the case when standard hours (maximum hours)
are higher than optimal hours (hours chosen optimally by the rm). This is the less interesting
case, since a small reduction in standard hours will not a¤ect the actual hours (optimal hours)
or employment.
Case B (corner solution): If the rm chooses working time exactly equal to standard working
hours, then a small reduction in T will unambiguously decrease usual hours and will have an
12These assumptions are necessary for the existence of interior solutions with overtime.
6
a priory ambiguous e¤ect on employment depending on the nature of the new equilibrium. If
after the reduction of standard hours it is still optimal to equalize usual hours to standard
ones then employment will increase. This is the model that supporters of work sharing have
in mind. Nevertheless, if the new equilibrium is not the one that equalizes standard and usual
hours the e¤ect on employment will be ambiguous due to a trade o¤ between the wage (w0T )
and the xed costs (f). It will only increase employment if xed costs (f) are su¢ ciently low
(see Calmfors and Hoel 1988 and Chemin and Wasmwe 2009) which, in general, is more likely
to be the case of a developing country than of a developed one.
Case C:Nw1
C
= NGh
G
, where Nw1 is the marginal cost of hours when usual time (h) is above
the standard working time (T ), C is the marginal cost of employment and NGh
G
is the marginal
rate of substitution between hours and employment which has to equal the ratio of the marginal
costs (Nw1
C
). In this case a reduction in T will increase h and will decrease N . Hence, in this
case, a reduction of the standard workweek is counterproductive as an instrument of policy.
We can check this with equation (6):
Gh
G
=
w1
C
=
w1
f   (w1   w0)T + w1h (6)
A reduction in T will, ceteris paribus, increase the denominator which means that w1
C
will
decline (i.e. the marginal cost of hours decreases relative to the marginal cost of employment).
The intuition for this is that a reduction of standard hours act as an increase in the xed
cost (f) per worker while maintain the cost of overtime unchanged; hence rms are induced to
substitute employment for longer hours.
To summarize, under cost minimization the reduction of standard hours has an a priori
ambiguous e¤ect on employment, since it will depend on the original situation of the rm.
Calmfors and Hoel (1988) extended the model by assuming that rms maximize prots
instead of minimize costs, which means that output is not xed anymore. The authors conclude
that the probability of having an increase in employment under prot maximization is even lower
than before (with cost minimization) since to the previous substitution e¤ect we have to add a
non positive scale e¤ect due to the negative e¤ect of higher labour costs on output prices and
output demand.13
13In case (C), where rms use overtime, the substitution e¤ect decrease employment and increase working
hours when the standard work week is reduced since the relative marginal costs of employment and hours
changed. With prot maximization, there is a scale e¤ect that gives an additional reduction on employment
due to the reduction in output and the use of labour services induced by an increase in C (labour costs), which
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Hitherto we have considered a reduction in working hours under a competitive model taking
the hourly wage as given which is the so-called direct e¤ect on employment. If there is an
increment in hourly wages14 (i.e. wage compensation), labour demand theory suggests that,
ceteris paribus, employment should decrease due to the substitution towards capital which is
the so-called indirect e¤ect on employment. This is clear if we write the reduced form of the
labour demand as N [w0(T ), T ] . Then the employment elasticity with respect to standard
hours is:
NT = NT jw0=const: + Nw0w0T (7)
Hence, the more negative the standard working time elasticity of the hourly wage (w0T ) the
less likely will be to have a positive e¤ect on employment15 . Then it will be crucial to consider
the e¤ect of wages since a reduction in standard hours with constant labour costs (i.e. with full
wage compensation) will make impossible to increase employment. This has consequences for
those workers who are paid the minimum wage, since it means that for them it is not possible
to increase employment with a reduction in standard hours16 .
Hart (2004) highlighted that it may exist also another indirect e¤ect on employment, specif-
ically an e¤ect on the mix of employment. Hart shows that, in a case with two groups of indi-
viduals, part-time workers and full-time workers where the former ones work less than standard
hours while the latter ones work overtime (i.e. similar to case C), a cut of standard hours has
two e¤ects: rstly, it leads to overtime-employment substitution among full time workers (i.e.
same conclusion as in case C). Secondly, leads the rm to increase the ratio of part-time to full-
time employees due to a higher relative cost of the latter ones. Furthermore, he concludes that
. . . the ability of rms to vary the mix of part time and full time workers may serve to mitigate
a tendency to increase average overtime hours given the shortened standard work week.
follows from the reduction in the normal working time. Also, Calmfors and Hoel (1988) showed that in case B
the result is still ambiguous under prot maximization but the probability of getting an increase in employment
will be smaller than in the cost minimization case.
14This could take place since wage-earners should resist a cut on income and, therefore, demand higher hourly
wages.
15Ceteris paribus. Although, if there is substitution from hours to employment when there is an increment in
wages the sign of the wage elasticity of employment (Nw0) will be positive. Nevertheless, we implicitly assumed
that it is negative. This is supported by empirical evidence (Hamermesh 1993).
16Kramarz et al. (2008) pointed out that standard hour reduction can also have two further benecial e¤ects
on employment. The rst one is that average labour productivity is larger when the duration of work is shorter.
The second one refers to the reorganization of the production process. This is because a cut in standard hours
may induce signicant reorganization in the production process leading to a more intensive utilization of capital
and thus higher employment.
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Recent developments suggest that by relaxing the perfect competitive market assumption
by allowing for monopsony power, a reduction of standard working hours might improve em-
ployment (Marimon and Zilibotti 2000) depending on the magnitude of the reduction of hours.
Without an upper hourly limit a monopsony that maximizes its prots subject to a labour
supply constraint will choose a work duration larger than the competitive work duration and
a smaller wage than the competitive one. This can be seen in gure 2 taken from Kramarz et
al. (2008). If an upper hourly limit is introduced the e¤ect on employment will be ambiguous
depending on the level of the upper limit relative to the monopsony use of hours. With an upper
hourly limit above the monopsony hours there will be no e¤ect on employment. If the upper
hourly limit decreases slightly (to a level that lies between the competitive and monopsony
usual hours) then employment levels will increase.
Therefore, and to summarize, the theoretical e¤ect of a reduction of standard hours on
employment is ambiguous and remains an empirical question.
3 Empirical Evidence
The empirical evidence on the employment e¤ect of reductions of standard hours is scarce and
it is concentrated on European experiences. The leading examples are Germany and France
which represent examples of the two main approches to reduce standard hours: by bargaining
agreements (Germany) and by legislation (France).
In the case of (West) Germany, Hunt (1999) uses industry level variation in reductions of
standard hours. She uses a xed e¤ect estimation approach to study the e¤ect of the reduction
of standard hours on employment. In her preferred specication she does not include wages
as a covariate since it might be jointly determined with employment in the collective bargain.
Therefore, she obtains the gross e¤ect of the cut of standard hours. Her ndings are that a
reduction of 1 standard hour decreases employment by 3.8%, but this is not signicant. Once
she includes a proxy for wages17 the point estimate becomes smaller and remains insignicant.
Since the employment e¤ects of a reduction in standard hours are likely to di¤er by skills18
Steiner and Peters (2000) use industry-level data and separate by unskilled, skilled and high
17She uses the index of bargained monthly wages rather than actual monthly wages.
18This is mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the direct e¤ect (holding hourly wage constant) may di¤er because
the possibility of substitution di¤ers by skill groups. Secondly, the indirect e¤ect of the reduction of standard
hours, due to wage compensation, may also di¤er by skill groups since the wage elasticity of labour demand is
likely to di¤er by skill groups as well.
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skilled workers. They show that, given wages, the direct employment e¤ect of a reduction in
standard working hours is negligible for all three groups. Nevertheless, once the adjustment
on wages is taken into account, the net employment e¤ect becomes negative on average, but
especially strong for unskilled workers.
Due to di¤erent theoretical predictions on the employment e¤ect generated by a reduction
of standard hours for rms with and without overtime workers, Andrews et al. (2005) specied
a model with di¤erent types of rms. Di¤erent types of rms are dened by the proportion
of workers who work overtime in each rm19.They use plant-level data (IAB Establishment
Panel) in a rst di¤erences estimation approach to study the e¤ect of the reduction of standard
working hours on employment (without controlling for wages due to a potential endogeneity
problem). Also, they instrumented standard hours by Industry level standard hours to deal
with potential endogeneity problems.They could not nd a signicant e¤ect on employment,
except (a positive one of 2%) in small plants in the East German non-service sector. They
argue that one of the possible explanations might be a lower increment in hourly wages in East
Germany.
Usually all the studies above face the di¢ culty of endogeneity of standard hours due to
the process of bargain with unions. That is why they instrumented it. An alternative way
would be to exploit the change in legislation as an exogenous variation in standard hours.
This is interesting since many countries have used legislation to vary standard hours (example:
Japan, Canada, Portugal, Italy, France among others), nevertheless microeconometric evidence
is scarse.
The oldest evidence from countries where a change in legislation was applied comes from
time series studies. For Japan, Brunello (1989) uses Monthly Labour Survey to estimate a
system of equations of demand and supply of hours and employment. He nds that a reduction
of standard hours has a negative and signicant impact on employment and a positive e¤ect
on overtime. There is a problem with this kind of approach since the reduction of standard
hours might be confounded with the e¤ect of another variable trending down. Also, there is a
problem of endogeneity between hours and employment since it does not utilize the exogenous
shock given by Japanese law.
The most studied country in reference to reductions on standard hours is France, which has
experienced two rounds of work week reductions, in 1982 and in 1998 (Aubry I )-2000 (Aubry
II ) respectively. Each of them with di¤erent characteristics (designs) and, most interestingly,
19Therefore there are three types of rms. Those rms where every worker works zero overtime. Those rms
where every worker works positive overtime and those rms where a proportion of workers work overtime.
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with di¤erent consequences due to these di¤erent designs of the policy. The main di¤erence
between the reform of 1982 and 1998-2000 is that in the latter one monthly labour cost remain
relatively constant whereas in the former one increased.
The only empirical evidence studying the employment e¤ects of the reduction of hours
from 40 to 39 per week in 1982 has been done by Crepón and Kramarz (2002). They use
an unexpected change in policy as a quasi-experiment. They used a di¤erence-in-di¤erences
approach which compares the di¤erence in the behaviour of the treatment group (those who
work 40 hours before 1982, then extended to include those who work overtime up to 48 hours)
with the di¤erence of the behaviour of the control group (those who work 36-39 hours before
1982).They conclude that those individuals in the treatment group in March 1981 have 3-
4% (depending on the especication) higher probability of being not employed in 1982 than
observationally identical workers who, in 1981, were working 36-39 weekly hours. Their analysis
neither includes hourly wages, which are crucial to understand the e¤ect of the reduction of
working hours, nor usual hours, which are more appropriate than actual hours in order to avoid
noise from short run shocks. Due to lack of information on hourly wages and usual hours before
1982 they decided to use a second identication strategy which uses information post policy
change including both variables since there are no data limitations after the implementation
of the policy. They conclude that those workers employed 40 hours in 1982 have at least (i.e.
a lower bound) a 4% higher probability of losing their jobs more often than those already
employed under the new standard workweek. Finally, Crepón and Kramarz (2002) show that
employees who work 40 hours and earn the minimum wage have a 7.7% higher probability of
losing their jobs than identical employees who work 39 hours.
With respect to the 1998-2000 reforms in France (Aubry I and II ), Askenazy (2008) points
out that the problem of Aubry I and II is that statistical ex-post evaluation of the impact of the
reduction of working hours is extremely di¢ cultwhich is mainly due to selection problems.
Selection comes from the fact that in 1998 was announced a reduction of hours to begin in
2000 but also were introduced nancial incentives (payroll tax subsidies) and exibility to
incentivate the adjustment of hours to a maximum of 35 per week. Among those studies which
try to encompass these selection problems are Crepón et al. (2005), Bunel (2004) and Gubian
(2000). They conclude that there is a positive net e¤ect on employment (around 6% - 9%) of
Aubry I and also positive but weaker e¤ect (around 3%) of Aubry II.
Kramarz et al. (2008) use several panel datasets to study the e¤ect of the reduction of
hours due to the Aubry laws on economic outcomes (i.e. employment, labour productivity, and
capital productivity among others). They found a positive e¤ect on employment, although they
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point out that their analysis is not fully causal. Specically, they recognize that they do not
have instruments that a¤ect the decision to reduce working hours without having an impact on
economic outcomes.
A di¤erent conclusion is reached by Estevão and Sa (2008). They use the French Labour
Force Survey and exploit the time di¤erence of the application of Aubry I (by rm size) to set
up a quasi-experiment which study the e¤ect of the law on workers welfare. Specically, they
use a di¤erence in di¤erence approach, where large rms (i.e. with more than 20 employees)
are used to construct the treatment group and small rms to construct the control group. They
nd that the Aubry I law had no aggregate e¤ect on net job creation. There are some caveats
in this study: rstly, they focus on the e¤ects of the Aubry I law and since this law includes
nancial incentives they do not identify the e¤ect of the reduction in hours. Secondly, the
control group and the treatment group are a¤ected in di¤erent magnitudes by the policy, which
violates one of the assumptions of the di¤erence in di¤erences approach. This later caveat is
also pointed out by Askenazy (2008).
Chemin and Wasmer (2009) obtain similar results. They use a triple di¤erence (DDD)
approach based on a particular characteristic of the FrenchAlsace-Moselle droit local20.
These regions have a slightly di¤erent labour law than the rest of France. Specically, they
have 2 extra public holidays, which were included in the non worked time once the reduction
to 35 hours took place in France. Hence, the reduction on hours was less stringent than in the
rest of France. The authors nd no signicant di¤erence on employment between this region
and the rest of France. However, the authors pointed out that their result might be due to the
fact that 2 days maybe too small to nd a signicant di¤erence.
Askenazy (2008) points out that the general consensus about Aubry I and Aubry II laws
is that they have generated a positive net e¤ect on employment. Nevertheless, there is no
agreement on what happened. This is, whether the cause of the positive net e¤ect on employ-
ment was the reduction of standard hours, the reduction of labour costs or the increment in
exibility. Specically, Askenazy (2008) argues that . . . selection bias may be too important to
allow conclusions to be reached.
A recent study by Raposo and Van Ours (2008) analyzes the case of Portugal where in
December of 1996 was introduced a new law on working hours which gradually reduced the
standard workweek from 44 hours to 40 hours and also increased exibility for rms.21 They
20Local Legislation.
21This exibility implied that the reduction was implemented taking into account that the normal workweek
could be dened on a 4 months average. It was also allowed to increase the maximum number of hours with 2
hours per day if the total did not exceed 10 hours per day and 50 hours per week.
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use a longitudinal data set (Quadros de Pessoal) which matchs rm and employee data to study
how this mandatory working hours reduction a¤ected employment destruction and earnings
of workers involved. They nd that hours reduction did not lead to an increased job loss of
workers directly a¤ected (although they do not separate the reduction of working hours from the
increase in exibility). They also nd that hourly wages increased, keeping monthly earnings
approximately constant for workers who were a¤ected by the new law. On a very recent
companion study Raposo and Van Ours (2009) extend their previous analysis to the study of
the reduction of standard hours on overall employment. Here, they nd a possitive e¤ect of
the reduction of working hours on overall employment through a fall in job destruction and
no e¤ect on job creation. They argue that their results might be explained by the increased
exibility in the use of the standard workweek that made it easier for rms to cope with the
reduced standard hours.22
To the best of our knowledge the only non European microeconometric study carried out so
far has been done for Canada by Skuterud (2007). He uses the Canadian Labour Force Survey
data and a triple di¤erence aproach to analyze the reduction of the standard workweek from 44
to 40 hours in the Canadian province of Quebec during the period 1997-2000. The peculiarity
of the Canadian case is that, unlike the European worksharing experiences presented above,
the Quebec policy contained no suggestion or requirement that rms provide wage increases
to compensate workers for lower hours. One important characteristic of this study is that
it includes actual hours instead of usual (average) hours. As several authors point out, this
may generate that what is being capture is the e¤ect of the economic conditions or irregular
(or unusual) overtime during that period of time instead (or in addition) of the e¤ect of the
reduction of standard hours. Despite this, the author nds that the reduction of weekly hours
worked failed to raise employment at either the provincial level or within industries where hours
of work were a¤ected relatively more.
Finally, Kapteyn et al. (2004) use aggregate panel data for 16 OECD countries. They nd
that the direct e¤ect of a reduction in standard hours has a positive e¤ect on employment but
that the upward indirect e¤ect of wages makes the nal e¤ect on employment insignicant. The
problem is that by aggregating data of countries with very di¤erent implementation process of
work sharing policies it is di¢ cult to disentangle the pure e¤ect of the reduction of standard
hours.
22Notice that in the case of Portugal and France, overtime rate are not constant. This makes more likely that
the reduction of standard hours generate a positive e¤ect on employment than in the traditional case presented
in section 2 with constant overtime rate (see Calmfors and Hoel 1988).
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4 Institutional framework of the Chilean labour reform
The new socialist government, which started in March of 2000, sent a new labour reform to
the Parliament during its rst year. A year later, in 2001, during the discussion of the reform
the possibility of a reduction in standard hours was introduced. Finally, the 5th of October
of 2001, the labour reform was published on the O¢ cial newspaper. This reform started to
operate almostfully the 1st of December 2001. The main adjustments and/or changes on the
Labour Codecan be classicated in 6 categories. Those are:
1. End of contracts (separation of workers) and layo¤ costs.
2. Exceptional distribution of the working time in some industries.
3. Over time hours.
4. Collective Bargains.
5. Working privileges, Management limiting nes, higher penalties and more supervision
from the Ministry of Labour.
6. Duration of the working week.
The reduction of the number of weekly working hours (last category) was the only part of
the reform which did not apply inmediately.23 The reduction of hours was announced to be
implemented by the 1st of January of 2005 (as explained below). This (three years) window was
established to give time for companies to adjust, although as we will show below, most of the
adjustment happened during the last year. This three years gap between the rst ve changes
and the sixth one is important since it allows us to isolate the reduction of standard hours from
the rest of the reform, which means that the reduction of standard hours is not contaminated
with the jointly implementation of other policies like in the case of Portugal and France (Aubry
I and II ).24
In reference to the duration of the maximum standard working week, the reform pre-
anounced a reduction in the upper limit from 48 to 45 hours per week. This reduction will
be compulsory in the whole country from the 01/01/2005; hence it gave to companies around
3 years to adjust. (From the 01/12/2001 until 31/12/2004 was optional).
23To see the description of the other elements of the labour reform see the appendix.
24Although this three years gap may generate anticipation e¤ects. As we will see below, the data suggest that
this e¤ect is not signicant. We will discuss extensively this point in the next section.
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This constraint will not apply to: independent workers (self-employed), workers who have
more than one employer, CEO, managers and all those people who work without direct superior
supervision; Also, it will not apply to those who work from their homes or in a place chosen
freely by their selves, insurer sellers, traveller sellers, and all those that do not work on their
jobpremises. All those that work on shing boats, those that work mainly outside the rm
dependencies and those that work by using long distance technologies are also excluded. Finally,
for people who work in hotels, restaurants or clubs (except the administrative, laundry and
kitchen sta¤) will not apply when the daily ow of customers is low and when they have to be
available for the customers.25
As part time job is dened as the ones that can not work more than 2/3 of the hours of a
full time job, the reduction from 48 to 45 means that from the 01/01/2005 part time workers
can not work more than 30 hours (before was 32 hours). The reform was explicit in the sense
that it pointed out that this reduction must not a¤ect workers who work intramarginal hours
before the reform (i.e. for example 40 or 45 hours).26
The reform stated that adjustments of working hours have to be done by agreement between
employer and employee. If there is no agreement, then employers can unilaterally modify
working hours without a¤ecting the weekly distribution of them.27 Despite the labour reform
clearly species the reduction of working hours it was ambiguous about the adjustment of wages.
Specically says:
Employee and employer have to make an agreement about monthly earning
in order to adjust it to the reduction on working hours, nevertheless the legislator
believes that it is not desirable a proportional reduction on monthly earnings as a
consequence of less working hours. It also states that: if there is no agreement
between employer and employee, then the employer has to maintain employee s
monthly earning irrespective if it is a x, variable or a mixed one.28
To clarify this issue, in September 2004 (i.e. before the mandatory reduction of working
hours) the Undersecretaryship of Labour pointed out that the reduction of monthly earnings
it is against the law given that the objective of the long adjustment window (3 years) has been
25Notice that these exemptions also applied when the maximum were 48 hours per week, hence it is not
altered by the reform.
26Res. de la Dirección del Trabajo 4338/168
27It cannot alter lunch time or the maximum hours of work per day (10 hours).
28Res. de la Dirección del Trabajo 4338/168. Own translation.
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to allow companies to reduce the impact on their costs (due to the maintenance of earnings)
by increments in productivity and readjustment of the production process"29. This rigidity in
earnings could be important since, as we saw in the theoretical model, it might increases the
likelihood of a negative e¤ect on employment levels even with high increments on productivity.30
This is especially important for those workers paid at the minimum wage.
As it was explained above the reform was not clear about earnings until september 2004,
but as we will see below rms seemd to follow the advice of the Undersecretaryship of Labour.
5 Description of the Data
5.1 General Description of the EPS Panel
To study the e¤ect of the reduction of working hours on employment transitions we use the
EPS Panel31, which has 3 waves so far (2002, 2004, 2006). When individuals are interviewed
for the rst time, they are asked about their labour market activities since January 1981 or
since they were 15 years old, whichever ocurred last (i.e. this includes employed, unemployed,
looking for a job for the rst time or inactive). They also reported the initial and nal month
and year for every spell.
The population of reference for the survey is all those who were a¢ liated32 since January
1981 until august 2001 (registered in the administrative les of each AFP33 and the INP34 and
who were also available in the system in august of 2001). Then, the Microdata center of the
economics department of the University of Chile selected an historic sample of all the individuals
a¢ liated to the system in 1981 or after, giving a sample size of 17,246 people for the rst wave.
This wave was carried out between June and December 2002 and included economic, socio-
demographic information of individuals like usual working hours (but not monthly earnings).
Subsequent waves updated the population of reference to include new a¢ liated and non a¢ liated
(who were not included in wave one). The second wave was carried out between November 2004
29Report 4338/168, September 2004, Ministry of Labour. Own translation.
30As Kramarz et al. (2008) pointed out: . . . .reduction in standard hours with full wage compensation appear
to be detrimental to employment even if the productivity gains are huge
31Panel de Encuesta de Proteccion Social.
32A¢ liated is dened as: all the people with at least one contribution to the pension system. 94% of
dependent workers are a¢ liated to the pension system irrespective of the type of contract (i.e. part time or full
time) (Superintendence of the Pension System).
33Administradora de Fondo de Pensiones. (Private pensions management funds).
34Instituto Nacional de Prevision. (i.e. National Institute of Pensions)
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- May 2005 and included information on monthly earnings and usual hours since January 2002.
Similarly, wave three included information on monthly earnings and usual hours since January
2004.
As a summary, the time line of the data and the problem under study are shown in gure
1.
Figure 1: Time line of the reform and waves of data
2002 2004 2006
Compulsory cut in working hours
(category six of the reform)
EPS 2002 (June-
December)
2003J
Publication of the law (5th of
October)
2005
EPS 2004 (November
2004-May 2005)
2007
EPS 2006 (September
2006-May 2007)
Categories one to five of the reform, (1st of December)
5.2 Evolution of usual hours, hourly wages and employment
An advantage of the EPS Panel relative to the Crepón and Kramarz(2002) study is that we
do have data on monthly earnings and usual hours since January 2002 (i.e. before the policy
was implemented in January 2005). Our setting would be ideal if the policy was announced
sometime after our rst period with earnings data. This is clearly not our case since there is a
pre-anouncement of the reduction of standard hours in december 2001 when the labour reform
was introduced.35 The fact that we only have full data from January 2002 onwards may imply
that we can have some anticipation to the policy in the sense that rms might reduced hours
during 2001-2002. Although this is not likely, due to the long period of adjustment (3 years)
35Also, it would be possible to have some change in rmsbehaviour due to the discussion of the reduction of
standard hours previous to its implementation in december 2001.
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introduced during the discussion of the labour reform, it is important to check the behaviour
of the distribution of hours to be condent that there were no signicant variation on it.
5.2.1 Anticipation via usual hours
We check the behaviour of usual weekly hours before the reduction of standard hours was
introduced (or even discussed) in the labour reform (e.g. January 2000), during the period of
optional adjustment (e.g. January 2003) and after the compulsory date (e.g. January 2005).
Figure 3 suggests that the discussion and publication of the labour reform which included the
announcement of reductions of weekly hours, did not have a signicant e¤ect on working hours
between January 2000 - January 2003 since the distribution of usual weekly hours remains the
same. The variation on the mean of usual weekly hours between January 2000 - January 2003
is negligible (around -0.02%). Similarly, the evolution of the standard deviation of usual weekly
hours decreases marginaly (-0.22%). On the other hand, the comparision between January
2003 and January 2005 shows an important variation on the distribution of hours, thus the
adjustment seems to start at some point in between. To check this, we analyze the information
on usual hours given in the second and third waves of the EPS panel (Figure 4) we observe that
there is a declining trend of the mean of usual weekly hours for dependent workers who work 44-
60 hours per week which started very slowly in mid 2003 until late 2004 when there was a sharp
drop due to the mandatory application of the reduction of weekly working hours in January
2005. The standard deviation maintains a fairly constant behaviour except in January 2005
where it su¤ered a sharp drop. Nevertheless, a few month after the compulsory reduction of
hours the standard deviation follows again a fairly constant behaviour although at a lower level
than the one before January 2005. These suggest that there might be a change of behaviour
of rms during 2003 and early 2004 but most of the adjustment seems to be held during late
2004 and begining of 2005.
5.2.2 Anticipation via earnings
It might be the case that rms did not anticipate the change of hours between January 2000 -
January 2003, but instead modied monthly earnings or the rate of growth of monthly earnings.
If these were the cases then it would imply an anticipation via monthly earnings. Furthermore,
the analysis of monthly earnings is important because the reform of December 2001 was not
clear about it adjustment. Originally the law suggested that it was "not desirable" to reduce
monthly earnings, although it was not explicitly forbidden in the reform. Only in September
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of 2004 the Undersecretaryship of Labour was precise about the illegality of the reduction of
monthly earnings (see the end of section 4). Therefore, if monthly earnings were unaltered and
individuals decreased the number of hours, then this implies that rms faced higher hourly
wages which might have consequences on employment (if they followed the "advice"). Also, it
could be the case that rms adjusted the nominal hourly wage (or monthly earnings) at a lower
rate than ination in order to crowd-out the increment of costs.36
Unfortunately, the rst wave of the EPS panel does not include information on monthly
earnings, hence we can not use the rst wave to analyze the behaviour of earnings before the
application of the labour reform in december 2001. An alternative is to use two indexes from
the National Institute of Statistics of Chile (gure 5) that we can trace back to January 2000 to
help us analyze if there were anticipation e¤ects via hourly wages. These indexes are: (a) the
nominal index of wages and (b) the nominal labour costs index. The di¤erence between the two
is that the former one does not include overtime pay while the latter one does.37 Both indexes
show that companies neither reduced the increment in nominal hourly wages nor reduced the
nominal hourly wages during the discussion of the labour reform in 2001. The same argument
holds after the labour reform began to be operative in december 2001 (and therefore the pre
announcement of the future reduction of weekly hours). Interestingly, we observe that there is
a higher increment in the hourly wage and hourly cost of labour indexes since the date of the
mandatory reduction of weekly hours (in late 2004-early 2005). Therefore, these indexes suggest
no anticipation e¤ects via hourly wages, and since there were no variation on the distribution
of hours, it is reasonable to assume no anticipation via monthly earnings.
When we analyze the data on hourly wages from waves two and three we observed an
increament on the nominal hourly wage in January 2005, as can be seen in gure 6 which give
us a general picture that is consistent with the information obtained from the nominal labour
cost indexes displayed in gure 5 in the sense of no major changes on hourly wages during the
three years gap, but wage compensation in January 2005 when they reduce hours.38
36Assuming that ination represents the increment in the price of the rm´s output.
37These indexes are used in the national account statistics by the Central Bank of Chile and also are the
reference for transport, electricity and telecommunication tari¤s.
38This may suggest that rms which adjusted hours between mid 2003 - late 2004 did not give wage com-
pensation to their employees. This may be due to the early ambiguity of the Undersecretary of Labour about
earnings. Issue solved in late 2004 when the illegality of the reduction of earnings was explicitly announced.
19
5.2.3 Anticipation via employment
Hitherto it seems that rms did not anticipate neither the change of hours nor the changes in
hourly wages. Nevertheless, it may be the case that rms changed their behaviour a¤ecting
employment as the result of the pre announcement of reduction of standard hours. We observe
employment behaviour in gure 7, where it is possible to observe that there is variation of
the employment rate within each year.39 It seems that employment rate behaviour does not
su¤er any signicant alteration due to the pre announcement of reduction of standard hours
in december 2001. Interestingly, there is a small decline of the employment rate in January
2005 which may imply a negative e¤ect on employment coming from the reduction of standard
hours. We will come back to this point below.
Based on these arguments, it seems to be no anticipation at least up to January 2003.
Furthermore, data suggest that there are some change in behaviour starting in mid 2003 until
late 2004 when a sharp adjustment occurs in hourly wages and standard and usual hours.
Therefore, if we use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach, as we will explain in the next section,
we can consider January 2002 - January 2003 as if it were a pre-policy period and given that
employment, usual hours and hourly wages were not a¤ected until January 2003 we can consider
the change in policy, ocurred later on, as if it were a quasi-experiment (i.e. exogenous shock).
5.3 Methodology, Time Periods and Control Group
5.3.1 Denition of pre and post-treatment period:
It could be the case that individuals employed between 46-48 hours have higher (lower) tran-
sition rates from employment to non-employment relative to similar groups (i.e. even in the
absence of the reduction in working hours those workers who work 46-48 hours might have higher
or lower subsequent unemployment probabilities). This makes the di¤erence-in-di¤erences ap-
proach a natural one to take, since the di¤erence between the control and treatment group
before the treatment is compared with the di¤erence between these groups after the treatment.
Therefore, the challenge with di¤erence-in-di¤erences is to: dene a suitable control group in
order to be able to identify the e¤ect of the policy and also to specify a pre-treatment and post-
treatment period. This latter point ideally refers to: rstly, a period where there are no policy
39This rate is: the number of people (per month) who declare to be employed over the total amount of people
who declare to be employed, unemployed and inactives. It is possible to observe that January and February
of each year are months with high employment rates (due to seasonal activities like agriculture among others).
Therefore, it is important for our analysis to use the same month each year.
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change (not even pre-announcement) which is the so-called pre-treatment period and secondly,
a period that includes the policy change which is the so-called post-treatment period. Based
on rmsnon anticipation behaviour presented in the section above and also on the signicant
di¤erence on the distributions of hours between January 2003 and January 2005 (see gure 3),
we consider January 2002 - January 2003 as the period before the policy change.
To dene the period which covers the application of the reduction of standard hours is more
complicated. This is because there are alternatives:
(a) On the one hand we can choose the start of the post-treatment period to be very close
to the treatment date (e.g. January 2004 - January 2005) but at the potential cost of being
a¤ected by anticipation e¤ects during the gap period between the pre and post-treatment period
(i.e. January 2003-January 2004). This is clear from the results presented above (see gure
4) where it is possible to appreciate some degree of variation on hours during January 2003 -
January 2004 which might a¤ect our estimation. A possible solution to this problem would be
the use of a one year moving window.40
(b) On the other hand, if we dene the post-policy period to start very close to the end
of our pre-policy period (i.e. January 2003-January 2005), then we overcome the potential
anticipation problem, avoiding the underestimation of the e¤ect of the policy change presented
in option (a) and making more likely the fact that covariates were not a¤ected by the pre-
announcement of the reduction of standard hours. Nevertheless, if we choose this latter option,
two issues will appear. Firstly, due to the two years transition window (instead of one year
transition in option a), it is more likely to have cases of people who loose their jobs and nd new
ones within this wider window of time. To avoid the complication of including people who loose
their job and nd a new one during this period it is possible to construct a proxy for tenure.
This proxy will allow us to rene the question of interest to: which of the individuals who were
employed in January 2003 are still employed at the "same job" in January 2005. In this way
we would recover those individuals a¤ected during January 2003- January 2005 who nd a new
job before January 2005. The EPS Panel does not have a direct measure of tenure, therefore
we construct one (see appendix).41 Secondly, if we want to dene the post-treatment period
40This is, x the pre-policy period as January 2002 - January 2003 and then dene the post-policy period as
January 2003 - January 2004 and estimate the di¤erence-in-di¤erence. If this estimation gives us a nonsignicant
e¤ect of the reduction of standard hours on employment transitions then it would impliy that there were non-
signicant anticipation e¤ects. If this is not the case, then anticipation e¤ects will be important and this method
would underestimate the e¤ect of the policy change. In case of non signicance, we repeat the procedure but
now replacing the post-treatment period for January 2004 - January 2005.
41Results does not change with respect to the specication without "tenure".
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as January 2003 - January 2005, and because we are using a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach,
we need to assume that the determinants of employment transitions over two years period and
its e¤ects are the same than the determinantes (and their e¤ects) of employment transitions
over a one year period or that these di¤erences are similar between the treated and controls
in a way that they will be eliminated in the di¤erentiation between groups (i.e. absorbed by
the common trend). If the assumption is not valid then our estimation would be contaminated
with the di¤erences on transitions of two years versus one year, thus they would not be directly
comparable.
We decided to use both denitions (a and b) to estimate the potential e¤ect of the reduction
of standard hours on employment transitions. Results are similar under both alternatives,
hence, due to the more restrictive nature of option (b), we choose this one as a matter of
presentation of the model. Then, we will check the results contrasting it with the less restrictive
option (a). In the nal section we will also check how robust are our results to alternatives
denitions of time periods.
5.3.2 Denition of control group:
Apart from the denition of time periods, di¤erences-in-di¤erences methodology requires the
denition of a suitable control group in order to be able to identify the e¤ect of the policy. In
our case we take those individuals who are as close as possible to the treatment group in terms
of hours to make their behaviour as similar as possible. Thus, we choose those individuals
who work between 44-45 hours per week as control group. As can be seen from the summary
statistics presented in Table 1, both groups seems to be very similar in terms of observables
(see denition of each covariate in the appendix).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics in January 2002
Control Group Treatment Group
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Gender (Female=1) 0.26 0.43 0.24 0.43
Age (years) 41.63 9.83 41.69 9.77
Schooling (7 categories) 3.72 1.73 3.72 1.73
Region (13 categories) 9.39 4.14 9.38 4.13
Occupation (7 categories) 5.52 2.14 6.13 2.05
Industry (9 categories) 5.80 2.49 5.18 2.48
Union (unionized=1) 0.17 0.37 0.14 0.35
Firmsize (7 categories) 5.13 2.18 5.12 2.17
Observations 970 2666
We observe that most of the variables are well balanced between control and treatment
groups. For example, the control group has 26% of females (i.e. when the dummy of gender
=1) while the treatment group has 24%. The average age of the control group is 41.6 years, while
the average in the treatment group is almost the same 41.7 years. The main di¤erences between
the control and treatment group come from occupation and industry. Furthermore, if we observe
the distribution of industry classication among the treatment and control (gure 8)42 we notice
that individuals in the control group tend to work relatively more on those industries classied
in categories 7, 8 and 9 which are: transport, communications, nancial intermedation and
public, social and personal services respectively and relatively less on categories 1, 3 and 6
which are: agriculture, hunting, forestry, shing, manufacturing and commerce respectively. By
analizing the distribution of occupation categories among treatment and control groups (gure
9) we nd that controls are more likely to work in categories 3 and 4 which are: clerical support
workers and services and sales workers respectively and work relatively less in categories 7 and
9 which are: craft and related trades workers and elementary occupations respectively.43
42Where the line with triangular markers represent the treatment group (g=1) and the smooth one the control
group (g=0).
43This information is consistent with the one in ENCLA 2003, which is a cross sectional labour survey for
2003.
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6 Empirical Strategy and Estimation
6.1 Identication Strategy
In contrast with most European cases, where the national adjustment of working hours was
not binding44, the reduction in the Chilean case was binding, since more than 65% of non-self
employed individuals with employment in the private sector were working 48 hours or more.
Hence, in this sense our case is similar to the French reduction of working hours of 1982 studied
by Crepón and Kramarz (2002).
It is true that in January 2002 the policy change was already known, but given that the
data suggest no anticipation, it can be considered as if it were unexpected. Given the un-
expected shockand that we do have workers already employed 45 or less hours (i.e. below
the new standard) in January 2002, this reduction in working hours can be seen as a quasi-
experiment. This quasi-experiment will allow us to study the employment transitions of those
in the treatment group during January 2002 - January 2003 and compare it to transitions of
treated individuals during January 2003 - January 2005. Then, we add a control group which
represents what would have happened with the treated if had they not been treated. If the
control group is a valid one, this procedure should retrive the e¤ect of the reduction of standard
hours on employment transitions for those a¤ected and it is called di¤erence-in-di¤erences ap-
proach. In our case, this is likely since treatment and control group have almost full common
support45 (see gures 8-10) and also are very similar in observables.46 Therefore, is reasonable
to assume that they are also similar in unobservables.47
It is also possible to have more than one treatment group, therefore we can extend our
analysis by including those individuals who work 49-60 hours a week.48 These are individuals
who are treated since they were working overtime hours before the policy change was imple-
mented. The upper limit of 60 hours per week is due to the maximum legal hours including
overtime established by Chilean Law.49
44Due to lower hours agreed by collective barging (see the cases of Germany, Sweden, among others).
45For the ATT, full common support means that given X the probability of being treated is less than one,
i.e. P (D = 1 j X) < 1. This implies that for a covariate X there are treated and control individuals, not only
treated individuals.
46See Table 1.
47Di¤erence-in-di¤erences does not required that treated and control have equal unobservables (i.e. similar
unobservables is su¢ cient but not necessary). It is only necessary that unobservables change similarly over
time.
48See for example Lechner (1999).
49Which has not been modied by the change in labour regulation under study.
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6.2 Econometric Model and Estimation
If the control group is a valid counterfactual (i.e. that the control group identify what would
have been the behaviour of the treatment group in the absence of the policy change) and workers
in the control group (i.e. 44-45 hrs.) have not been a¤ected by the reduction of the working
hours, then we can follow Crepón and Kramarz (2002) and represent our problem in terms of
potential outcomes:
NEi;t+p = NE
0
i;t+p +Dit

NE1i;t+p  NE0i;t+p

(8)
Where: NEi;t+p is the non employment status50 of individual i at period "t+p", especicaly:
NEi;t+p =1 if, conditional on being employed at period "t", individual i is not employed (or
employed at a "di¤erent job") in period "t+p", where p is the lenght of the transition period (in
years) and NEi;t+p =0 otherwise.51 Di;t=1 if the individual i is employed more than 45 hours
a week before the policy change (i.e. in the treatment group), and the superscripts represent
0 = control group and 1 = treatment group. Equation (8) shows the decomposition of the
non employment status of individual i as the sum of the non employment status of individual
i in the control group plus the extra e¤ect due to the treatment (i.e. terms in bracket). The
problem with the bracket is that only one of these two variables is observable. This problem
makes the individual identication of the treatment impossible; nevertheless we can identify
the expectation of the e¤ect given that maximum weekly working hours changed, which is the
so-called Average Treatment on the Treated(ATT ):
E

NE1i;t+p  NE0i;t+pj Dit = 1

(9)
Where to capture (9) we need to assume:
E

NE0i;t+pj NEit = 0; xit; Dit = 1

= E

NE0i;t+pj NEit = 0; xit; Dit = 0

(10)
This is, that conditional on observable variables at period "t" (i.e. xit) the counterfactual in
which workers are not a¤ected by the reduction (i.e. NE0i;t+p) is independent of being a¤ected
50This includes unemployed and inactive status
51The proxy for tenure enters here when "di¤erent job" is dened. See the appendix for more details about
the denition of tenure.
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by the reduction of hours to 45 per week (i.e. the so-called Conditional (mean) Independance
Assumption (CIA)).52 When (10) holds, the expectation of (8) given the treatment can be
represented as:
E [NEi;t+pj NEit = 0; xit; Dit] =
E

NE0i;t+pjNEit = 0; xit

+DiE

NE1i;t+p  NE0i;t+pj NEit = 0; xit ; Dit = 1

(11)
If we use a cross-section model to analyze employment losses during the period between
January 2003 - January 2005 (i.e. p=2) of individuals employed in January 2003, and for
simplicity we assume homogeneous e¤ects, then (11) becomes:
E (NEi;05j NEi;03 = 0; xi;03; Di;03) = x0i;03 + g1i;03 (12)
where: NEi;05 = 1 if, conditional on being employed in January 2003 (i.e. NEi;03 = 0),
individual i is not employed or employed at a di¤erent job at the end of the transition period
(i.e. January 2005) and zero otherwise. g1i;03=1 for individuals who are in the treatment
group (i.e. working 46-48 hours in January 2003). x
0
i;03 is a vector of covariates measured in
January 2003.  is the average impact of the reduction in working hours on employment to non
employment transition for those individuals who were working between 46-48 hours per week
in January 2003.53 To include overtime (12) can be extended to:
52In the case of balance panel data, CIA is su¢ cient but not necessary since it is too strong. The reason
is that CIA imposes that conditional on x, the treatment does not a¤ect the untreated potential outcome. In
the linear model this is equivalent to E (u0;ijx;D) = E (u0;ijx) :Nevertheless, in di¤erence in di¤erences we only
need that E (u0;a   u0;bjx;D = 1) = E (u0;a   u0;bjx;D = 0) , which is the so-called common macro trend. In
case of repeated cross-section or unbalance panels we need to strenghten the common macro trend by adding
the assumption of no systematical change in composition of the groups in terms of the untreated potential
outcomes . This new assumption is redundant with balance panels since it will always be true. These two
assumptions together are equivalent to the CIA, since as Lee (2005) points out CIA rules out systematic moves
accross groups.
53As mentioned above, we assume homogeneous e¤ects since  represents the change in the intercept between
the treated and control groups. By neglecting heterogeneity and estimating the average e¤ect of the reduction
of standard hours as in (12), the expected value of the unexplained component of employment transitions,E (i),
also includes the term E (i;03 - )g1i;03, where i;03 is the individual-specic e¤ect of treatment in year 2003.
Thus, for identication of  under the homogeneity assumption, we now require that: (a) homogeneity really
holds (i.e. no heterogeneity), or (b) if homogeneity does not hold, then we have to assume that the heterogeneity
in the e¤ect of treatment has to be uncorrelated with their occurrence. This latter assumption is likely to hold
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E (NEi;05j NEi;03 = 0; xi;03; Di;03) = x0i;03 + sg1i;03 + ovg2i;03 (13)
Where the vector of covariates xi;03 includes variables like: age, gender (female=1, male=0),
education (6 categories), ln (hourly wage), region (12 dummies), size of the rm (6 categories),
dummies for occupation (6 categories), industry (8 categories), unionization status (union-
ized=1, 0 otherwise) and the 1 year lagged weekly hours54. Again s is the average impact of
the reduction in working hours on employment to non employment transition for those individ-
uals who were working between 46-48 hours per week in January 2003 and ov measures the
same but for people who were working overtime at that time (i.e. 49-60 hours). We estimate
(13) for January 2002 -January 2003 and for January 2003-January 2005 obtaining the results
displayed in Table 2:
Table 2: OLS estimation
Employment Status in January 2003 Employment Status in January 2005
given employment in January 2002 given employment in January 2003
All Men Women All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Workers with 46-48 hours -0.001 0.008 -0.022 0.020 0.013 0.028
(0.014) (0.015) (0.032) (0.015) (0.017) (0.038)
Workers with 49-60 hours 0.015 0.021 0.008 0.006 0.022 -0.041
(0.018) (0.019) (0.045) (0.019) (0.020) (0.045)
Observations 3535 2663 872 3028 2268 760
Note: control variables included are age, dummies for gender, educational level, occupation, industry,
unionization status, region, size of the rm and two group dummies (i.e. standard and overtime groups).
Covariates also include: logarithm of hourly wage and 1 year lagged weekly hours. The population includes all
full-time dependent workers in the private sector who were working in January 2002 (for columns 1-3) and in
January 2003 (for columns 4-6). Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis.
The estimates of the rst column suggest that workers in both treatment groups (i.e. those
who were working 46-48 hours and those who were working 49-60 hours) in January 2002 have
in our case since, due to the exogeneity of the policy change, cross-sectional units do not self-select into lower
hours (i.e. treatment) based on their expected gains. Therefore, E (i;03 - )g1i;03 = 0. If we think that
the homogeneity assumption is less likely to hold, then heterogeneous e¤ects can be introduced. To do this
g1i;03 could be interacted with the x variables. Thus, these interactive terms should capture the di¤erence in
the slopes between the treated and control groups. The cost of the heterogeneity is the curse of dimensionality
problem, due to the potential too many interactions and covariates.
54This is to make the conditional mean independence assumption more plausible (Heckman, Ichimura, Smith
and Todd (1998)). Despite the signicance of this variable in the estimation our results of the e¤ect of the
reduction of standard hours does not change if it is excluded.
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no di¤erent transitions to non employment when compared with those workers in the control
group (44-45 hours) category. When we observe the fourth column there is a change on signs on
the point estimates but they are still not signicant. When we decompose the sample into men
and women it is possible to observe that in both cases they are statisticaly insignicant. In the
rest of the estimation we will focus on male results mainly for two reasons. Firstly, the female
group is small and therefore it will give us very unprecise estimates (e.g. the femalecontrol
group has 218 and 190 women in each cross-section respectively). Secondly, and most important,
this group seems to violate one of the assumptions as we will explain below. In the case of
men, point estimates transitions for the 46-48 hours group (standard group hereafter) and for
the 49-60 hours group (overtime hereafter) are not signicantly higher than the transition of
the control group in both periods (2002-2003 and 2003-2005).
6.3 Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences
We use a di¤erence-in-di¤erence (DID) approach to study if there is a specic e¤ect during the
January 2003- January 2005 period that was not present during the January 2002- January 2003
period. We dene the pre-treatment employment transition to be the one between January 2002-
January 2003 and the post-treatment employment transition to be the one between January
2003 - January 2005. In order to obtain the e¤ect of the policy change on the employment
transitions we estimate equation (14) for all full-time dependent workers (i.e. not self-employed)
in the private sector who work between 44-60 hours per week.
E (NEi;t+pj NEit = 0; xit; Dit) = x0it+sg1it+ovg2it+1dt+p+2g1itdt+p+3g2itdt+p (14)
Where dt+p =1 if the new maximum standard hours were in place at "t+p" and zero other-
wise, and g1itdt+p is an interaction term composed by the time dummy (i.e. dt+p) and the group
dummy for those working 46-48 hours (i.e. g1it). Similarly, g2itdt+p is the interactive term for
those working overtime (49-60 hours): Therefore, the parameters of interest will be 2 and 3.
The estimates of the coe¢ cients of the interaction terms are presented on panel A of Table 3.55
55For our estimations we are using those individuals who are employed at the begining of each transition
period, which makes the adoption of a repeated cross section a better option than the use of the data as
if it were a panel. This implies that some individuals will appear twice in the sample used in the analysis.
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Table 3: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences and GAP estimation
January 2002 - January 2003 - January 2005
A High and Low skill workers
Di¤erence-in-Di¤erences Gap (per overtime hour e¤ect)
Dependent variable: NEt+p Dependent variable: NEt+p
covariates with covariates without covariates with covariates without
log(hourly wage) log(hourly wage) log(hourly wage) log(hourly wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard group 0.005 0.010 0.002 0.006
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Overtime group 0.008 0.013 0.002 0.003
(0.025) (0.025) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 5084 5084 5084 5084
B Low skill workers
Standard group 0.008 0.013 0.002 0.006
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Overtime group 0.010 0.015 0.002 0.004
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Observations 3698 3698 3698 3698
Note: panel A displays estimates for all dependent workers in the private sector included in those occupations
a¤ected by the reduction of standard hours. Panel B, displays the estimates for all those in panel A but who
have up to complete high school level of education only. Control variables include: age, dummies for educational
level, occupation, industry, unionization status, size of the rm, region and two group dummies (i.e. standard
and overtime). It also includes the logarithm of hourly wage, a time dummy and one year lagged weekly hours.
Clustered standard errors (at the individual level) are given in parenthesis.
From the rst column of panel A of Table 3, we observe that point estimates of the e¤ect
of the reduction of standard working hours increase the transitions from employment to non-
This may generate non independent observations for those individuals. A solution to this would be to use
clustered standard errors (at the individual level). Also, in DID framework, the use of group*time dummies,
when individual data is used, poses the same problem encountered when using macro data in microeconometric
regressions, known in the literature as the Moulton problem. Moulton problem often generates downward-biased
standard errors. In our case, the concern is that observations for individuals on the same group of hours in
a given point in time might be correlated. Bertrand et al. (2004) have noted that matters can be further
complicated if there is correlation over time within groups. In our case, this would occur if the idiosyncratic
error of individuals on the same group of hours were correlated over time. As noted by Angrist and Pischke
(2009) the debate on how to deal with these issues (when there is a small number of groups) has not reach a
consensus. This is because, the best practice in cases where the presence of only a small number of groups or
time periods advices against the adoption of standard errors clustered at the group*time level (to address the
Moulton problem) or at the group level (to tackle serial correlation within groups). Given such uncertainty,
prominence is given to the concern that the use of repeated observations on individuals very likely to generate
correlation over time and therefore standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
29
employment in 0.5 percentage points for those who were working between 46-48 hours per week
and in 0.8 percentage points for those who were working between 49-60 hours per week. In both
cases the point estimates are insignicantly di¤erent from zero. Nevertheless, it is interesting
that by comparing the point estimates of the rst two columns of panel A we observe that
the e¤ect of the hourly wage is as predicted. When hourly wage is excluded, and therefore
we allow for an increment in hourly wage, the point estimate of the e¤ect of a reduction of
standard hours on transitions to non-employment almost doubled (1.3 percentage points). It
is important to notice that even though the e¤ect of hourly wage are as predicted they are not
strong enough to make the point estimates signicant.
The overtime group has a wide range of hours since it includes individuals with 49 hours to
individuals with 60 hours per week. This broad range might give unprecise results because the
analysis above uses the interaction between the post-treatment indicator (i.e. d) with a binary
indicator of the treatment group and therefore it assumes that, within groups (standard and
overtime), the e¤ect of the reduction of hours would be the same irrespective of the number of
hours worked. This means that the e¤ect would be the same if individual i works 49 hours or 60
hours per week. Therefore, following Stewart (2004) we can apply an alternative estimator, the
so-called "gap" that in our case becomes "hour gap". This gap should capture the di¤erence
between the hours of individual i in period t with respect to the new standard in period t+1.
Formally:
GAP =
(
hit   St+p if St+p < hit
0 else
)
(15)
Where hit is individuals i usual hours at time t, St+p is the relevant new standard at time
t+p. The idea is to replace the overtime group dummy (g2it) for the gap in equation (14).
Results are presented in the third and fourth columns of Table 3. The estimated e¤ects are
smaller but with the same sign than those analized before. It is especially interesting the
reduction of the point estimate in the overtime group (from 0.8 to 0.2 percentage points with
hourly wages and from 1.3 to 0.3 percentage points without hourly wages). These are consistent
with the interpretation of the coecients when the gap is used. In these cases the interpretation
is by "unit gap" which in our case is by "overtime hour". Hence, the fact of being in the
overtime group and being treated increases transitions to non-employment in 0.2 percentage
points per hour of overtime when hourly wages are included and in 0.3 percentage points per
hour of overtime when hourly wages are excluded. In both cases, results are very small and not
signicantly di¤erent from zero.
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Furthermore, because the employment e¤ect may di¤er by skill levels we re estimate equation
(14) and (15) but excluding high skilled workers. This means that we restrict the sample to
those workers with less or equal studies than full high school. Results are presented in panel
B of Table 3. They suggest that the reduction of hours does not a¤ect employment transitions
(i.e. there is an insignicant positive e¤ect of between 0.8 - 1.3 percentage points depending
if we are or we are not keeping hourly wages xed). Similarly, for overtime workers, estimates
suggest an insignicant e¤ect on employment transitions (i.e. an insignicant positive e¤ect
between 1-1.5 percentage points depending on the inclusion or exclusion of hourly wages).
6.4 Hourly wages and monthly earnings
As pointed out throughout this study, the e¤ects of hourly wages as a source of the so-called
indirect e¤ect is important in order to estimate the impact of a reduction of standard hours on
employment transitions. This is because when weekly hours are reduced and monthly earnings
are held constant, hourly wage increases inducing a substitution e¤ect towards capital. This
means that because of the imposibility of downward adjustment of the monthly earnings, the
treatment a¤ects indirectly employment transitions via hourly wages. Nevertheless, it could
be the case that the mechanism of transmission of the indirect e¤ect is not hourly wages, or
at least not hourly wages alone. It could be the case that changes on monthly earnings are
a¤ecting employment transitions. To study this we re-estimate equation (14) but now replacing
the logarithm of hourly wage for the logarithm of monthly earnings.
Table 4: estimation with monthly earnings instead of hourly wages
Pooled OLS estimation
January 2002 - January 2003 - January 2005
Dependent variable: NEt+p
covariates with covariates without
log(monthly earnings) log(monthly earnings)
(1) (2)
Standard group 0.009 0.010
(0.019) (0.019)
Overtime group 0.012 0.013
(0.025) (0.025)
Observations 5084 5084
Note: the sample includes all full-time dependent workers in the private sector. Control variables include:
age, dummies for educational level, occupation, industry, unionization status, size of the rm, region and two
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group dummies (i.e. standard and overtime), it also includes the logarithm of monthly earnings, a time dummy
and one year lagged weekly hours. Clustered standard errors (at the individual level) are given in parenthesis.
By comparing the estimates of the rst and second column of Table 4 we observe that the
point estimates are almost the same in the case when we control for monthly earnings with
respect to the case when we do not control for it. This suggest that there are no e¤ects on
employment transitions coming through monthly earnings.
One further complication may be the potential endogeneity of wages and employment tran-
sitions. If this is the case, then our estimates will be biased. A solution would be the use of
an instrument which has to be correlated with hourly wage but not with employment transi-
tions. To nd such an instrument is not easy and the consequences of a bad instrument can
be worse than the solution. The endogeneity of wages seems less likely due to our choice of
post-treatment period. This is, given the non-anticipation behaviour on hours, employment
and hourly wages analized above and by taking January 2003 (instead of January 2004) as the
period when covariates are measured for the transition January 2003 - January 2005 (instead of
January 2004 - January 2005), we are minimizing the possibility that hourly wages were jointly
determined with employment. Also, in our favor is the evidence of strong wage rigidity in Chile
(Cobb and Opazo 2008) which makes less likely the existance of endogeneity between wages
and employment transitions.56 Furthermore, in our favor is the fact that the expected point
estimates coe¢ cients behave as expected when hourly wages are included in regression (14)
and also that monthly wages seem not to have an impact on points estimates of employment
transitions.
6.5 Part-Time workers
A very tempting alternative to potentially explain the low magnitudes of the point estimates
above would be Harts proposition about change on the mix of employment. Recalling that in
a simple model Hart (2004) shows that with two types of workers (full time and part time)
where the latter ones work less than standard hours while the former ones work overtime,
a reduction of standard hours will have two e¤ects: rstly, it leads to overtime-employment
substitution among full time workers. Secondly, leads the rm to increase the ratio of part
time to full time employees due to a higher relative cost of the latter ones (i.e. a change on the
mix of employment). Therefore, a change on the mix of employment (by vary the mix of part
56Cobb and Opazo (2008) point out that "the average length of time that it would take for the whole economy
to adjust its wages is just over nine quarters, with some di¤erences between economic sectors".
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time and full time workers) may serve to mitigate a tendency to reduce employment given the
shortened standard work week.
The inconvenience comes from the labour reform itself. This is because part-time employ-
ment is dened in the Chilean Labour Code as up to a proportion of the full time standard
employment workweek. Specicaly, says that part-time employment is dened as up to 2
3
of
the maximum standard workweek, which was equivalent to 32 hours before the reduction of
hours and 30 hours after it. Hence, Harts point is weakened here since there is a reduction
for both groups, full-time with overtime and part-time.57 Therefore, we should not expect a
big e¤ect of the mix of employment on overtime transitions to non employment. Despite the
small number of people working in the 30 - 32 hours category it is possible to argue that the
proportion of individuals working 30 and 32 hours does not change between 2002 and 2005. For
example, 1.42% and 0.17% of the individuals working in the private sector were working 30 and
32 hours respectively in January 2002. In January 2005 the proportions were 1.38% and 0.18%
respectively. This suggest no important movements between full-time and part-time workers.
6.6 Checking the Assumptions
In order to identify the e¤ect of the policy change on employment transitions we introduced
two assumptions. The rst one is that workers in the control group must not have been a¤ected
by the reduction of the working hours. The second assumption is that there are no interactions
between the group dummies and the time e¤ects in the absence of the policy change. We check
both assumptions here.
6.6.1 Checking the validity of the control group:
In order to test the rst assumption we follow Crepón and Kramarz(2002) idea but extend
it by the use of usual hours (instead of actual hours). We estimate the change in usual hours
between t and t +p for those workers in the control group who were still employed at t +p.
Then, if the assumption holds we should not expect to nd signicant di¤erences in changes of
usual hours during the period January 2003 - January 2005 with respect to the period January
2002 - January 2003. This should not be true for workers in the treatment groups. This
57It is also true that while full-time faced a 3 hours cut, part-time faced a 2 hours cut, hence we could exploit
that variation on the magnitud of the policy, but unfortunately there is few people working in that range of
hours.
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test assumes no employment e¤ects since it uses individuals still employed after the transition,
which is consistent with what we have found on our estimations above.Therefore, we estimate
the following cross-sectional models for January 2002- January 2003 and for January 2003-
January 2005:
E
 
Hourst+pi;t j NEit = 0; NEi;t+p = 0; xi;t; Di;t

= x
0
it + cg0it + sg1it + ovg2it (16)
Where Hourst+pt is the change of usual hours between t and t+p, and x
0
it is a vector of
controls which includes the same variables than in equation (14) except for the intercept which
is excluded here.58 The other three variables ( gkit; where k = 0; 1; 2) are dummies equal to one
for 44-45, 46-48 and 49-60 hours respectively and zero otherwise. The estimates are presented
in the rst two columns of panel A of Table 5.
58Otherwise the three group dummies will sum up to one which generates multicollinearity if an intercept is
included.
34
Table 5: Variation in usual hours and log(hourly wage) during transition periods given
employment at the end of the period
A Var. in usual hours between Var. in usual hours between Pooled OLS
January 2002 - January 2003 January 2003 - January 2005
given employment in given employment in
January 2003 January 2005
(1) (2) (3)
Control group -0.19 -0.25 -0.09
(0.51) (0.52) (0.39)
Standard group -0.23 -2.92*** -2.86***
(0.50) (0.51) (0.38)
Overtime group -0.54 -0.89* -0.26
(0.50) (0.50) (0.39)
B Var. in ln(hourly wages) between Var. in ln(hourly wages) between Pooled OLS
January 2002 - January 2003 January 2003 - January 2005
given employment in given employment in
January 2003 January 2005
Control group 0.021 0.034 0.012
(0.028) (0.028) (0.014)
Standard group 0.031 0.066*** 0.031**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.013)
Overtime group 0.033 0.056** 0.020
(0.029) (0.029) (0.016)
Observations 2080 1824 3904
Note: for the rst two columns of panel A control variables include: age, dummies for educational levels,
occupation, industry, size of the rm, region, unionization status, three group dummies (control, standard and
overtime, thus we drop the intercept) and the logarithm of hourly wage. For the third column of panel A control
variables are the same than for the rst two columns plus the inclusion of a time dummy and the interactions
of all the group dummies with the time dummy. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis for the rst
two columns and clustered standard errors (at the individual level) are given in parenthesis for the last column.
For panel B, the covariates are the same except the logarithm of hourly wage which is excluded since in panel
B the dependent variable is the variation on the logarithm of hourly wage. *p<0.10, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01.
Estimates suggest that in the rst period there are no signicant variation in usual hours,
which seems to support our ex-ante exploration of the distribution of usual hours in section 5.
Nevertheless, estimates for the second period seems to suggest that there are signicant e¤ects
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in the standard and overtime groups at 1% and 10% of signicance respectively. This negative
variations on usual hours might happened even in the abcense of the reduction of standard
hours, hence we extended the model in (16) to try to estimate if there was a signicant e¤ect
in January 2003- January 2005 that can not be found in January 2002- January 2003. In order
to do this we estimate (17):
E
 
Hourst+pit j NEit = 0; NEi;t+p = 0; xit; Dit

= x
0
it + sg1it + ovg2it + 1dt+p
+2g1itdt+p + 3g2itdt+p + 4g0itdt+p (17)
Where gkitdt+p (k = 0; 1; 2) represents the interaction variable between the post treatment
dummy (dt+p) and the respective group dummy (gkit). x
0
it does not include a constant and the
base category are those workers in the control group in January 2002 - January 2003. Estimates
are presented in the last column of Table 5 and suggest that the change of usual hours in period
January 2003- January 2005 is not signicantly di¤erent from the change of usual hours during
the period January 2002- January 2003 for the control and overtime group whereas for the
standard group the estimates suggest that the change of usual hours it is di¤erent and signicant
at 1% respectively. This suggest that our control group is a valid one.59 This was not the case
for females and that is why we decided to exclude them from the analysis. For the standard
group, usual hours decrease by almost the same amount of the statutory reduction of 3 hours
(i.e. 2.86 - (-0.09) = 2.77). For the overtime group the results were unexpected since we
obtained no signicant variation of usual hours instead of expected (theoretical) increment.
This results may be explained because for workers in the overtime group, the reduction of the
standard workweek produces only an income e¤ect, which will tend to reduce desired hours of
work, potentially o¤setting the increase in hours coming from the labour-demand side.
Panel B of Table 5 presents the results of the estimation of equations 16 and 17 when
the dependent variable is the variation (change) of ln(hourly wages) for the control, standard
and overtime groups. Results suggest no signicant changes on ln(hourly wages) for any of the
three groups during January 2002 - January 2003, but results suggest a signicant increment on
ln(hourly wage) for the standard and overtime groups for January 2003 - January 2005. Once
POLS is estimated in column 3, only the e¤ect for the standard group remains signicant.
59In our favor is one of the specications of the labour reform. It states that "....all individuals whose contracts
specify less or equal hours than 45 per week should not be a¤ected by the reduction of hours" (own translation).
Law 19758. 27-09-2001. Library of the Congress.
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Specicaly, for the standard group, hourly wage increase by 1.9% (i.e. 0.031 - (0.012) = 0.019).
Thus, a decrease of one hour per week, from the original 48 hours (i.e. a 2% reduction) generated
a 1.9% increment in hourly wage, which is in line with our ndings in gure 6 suggesting wage
compensation. This result imply that monthly earnings for individuals in the standard group
remained close to the same after the reduction in hours. We can also observed from panel B
of Table 5 that the result also suggest no signicant spillover e¤ects on hourly wages of the
control group.
The fact that results for the standard group are as expected with respect to reduction of
usual hours and increments on hourly wages but not on employment seems peculiar. One
possible explanation for the non signicant e¤ect on employment might be the long period of
adjustment given by the government to rms (almost 3 years), which might allowed rms to
adjust their production process or the productivity of workers. Another reason might be that
the di¤erence in skills between employed and unemployed makes substituting the lost hours
of the former with jobs for the latter more di¢ cult (this can be reinforced by high severance
payments as in the Chilean case). A further potential reason comes from the labour supply side.
On the one hand, for workers in the overtimegroup, the reduction of the standard workweek
produces only an income e¤ect, which will tend to reduce desired hours of work, potentially
o¤setting the increase in hours coming from the labour-demand side. On the other hand, for
workers in the standard group, the policy also produces a substitution e¤ect, which tends to
raise desired hours of work and reduces the likelihood that work-sharing leads to employment
growth. These labor supply adjustments are likely to have signicant dampening e¤ects on any
potential employment-hours tradeo¤s (as Skuterud 2007 points out).
6.6.2 Checking the common macro trend:
The second assumption is that there are no interactions between the group dummies and the
time e¤ects in the absence of the policy change (i.e. common macro tren). The usual method
to test this is to use a pre-treatment period. In our case, we can do that but at the cost of
sacricying the model with hourly wages. We can use equation (14) in a period where there is
no pre-announcement of reductions of standard hours. A candidate would be a pre-treatment
period like January 1999 - January 2000 and January 2000 - January 2001. Since we do not
have hourly wages for this period we estimate equation (14) but excluding the logarithm of
hourly wages from vector x. Estimates are presented in Table 6.
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Table 6: Falsication test for January 1999 - January 2001
Pooled OLS estimation
January 1999 - January 2000 - January 2001
Dependent variable: NEt+p
Standard group 0.001
(0.017)
Overtime group -0.003
(0.020)
Observations 5568
Note: control variables include: age, dummies for educational levels, occupation, industry, rm size, union-
ization status, region, two group dummies (standard and overtime group), 1 year lagged weekly hours, a time
dummy and interaction of all the group dummies with the time dummy. Clustered standard errors at the
individual level are given in parenthesis.
Results from the rst column of Table 6 show that both interactive terms are not signicantly
di¤erent from zero, therefore the assumption of zero interaction terms in the absence of the
reduction of standard hours is well supported by the data.
7 Robustness
It is important that our results do not depend on any specical construction. In order to
analize the sensitivity of our estimations we modify the underlying especicantion in several
ways. Special attention is given to the denition of time periods, control group and model of
estimation. Also, potential problems with measurement error are analized.
7.1 Denition of Control Group
The analysis of employment transitions has been carried out by comparing a treatment and a
control group, where this latter one has been dened to be those individuals who work between
44-45 hours per week. The advantage of this narrow range is that we make the control group
as similar as possible to those in the treated group (in term of unobervables) and therefore
it is expected that individuals in the control group respond to shocks in similar ways than
individuals in the treatment group. Nevertheless, there is a trade o¤, since widening the
control group range has also some advantages: rstly, increases the number of obervations and
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therefore increase the precision of the estimation (ceteris paribus). Secondly, it diminish the
problem created by potential missclasication of hours. Thirdly, reduces the impact of the
threats to the identication strategy like spillovers e¤ects and substitution between groups.
We re-estimate equation (14) with diferents denitions of control group. Results are pre-
sented in Table 7 in the appendix. In all the cases, as before, the point estimates are not
signicant. Furthermore, point estimates are robust to the denition of control group, all of
them in the range (0.4 - 1.3 percentage points) for the standard group and in the range (0.7 -
1.9 percentage points) for the overtime group. We also observe that the e¤ect of hourly wages
are as expected in all the cases, this is increasing the magnitudes of point estimates when they
are positive, although they remain insignicant.
7.2 Denition of Time Periods
It has been acknowledge that one problem is the potential anticipation e¤ects due to the pre-
announcement of the policy. The data analized in section 5 above seems to suggest that
the anticipation e¤ect was not signicant and due to this result we dened January 2002 -
January 2003 as the "pre policy" period and January 2003-January 2005 as post policy period.
This conclusion was supported by the results displyed in gure 4. However, because this is
an important issue to take into account when we further check the robustness of our results
with respect to the denition of periods, we investigate the sensitivity of our results when the
denition of pre and post policy period are modied.
Results are presented in two panels. Panel A presents estimates when time period is mod-
ied, for example: instead of being January 2002 - January 2003 - January 2005, it becomes
February 2003 - February 2003 - February 2005 for the rst two columns pf panel A and March
2002 - March 2003 - March 2005 for the last two columns of panel A. Panel B present the result
for the alternative especication of post-treatment period (option a) presented in subsection
5.3.. Especication which uses a moving window from January 2003 - January 2004 in the
rst two columns of panel B and January 2004 - January 2005 in columns 3 and 4 of panel B.
In either case, results are not signicant. Therefore, our estimates seems to be robust to the
denition of time period (panel A) and to the denition of post-treatment period (panel B).
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7.3 Model specication
All estimations presented so far have used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) mainly due to its
simplicity (and the potential need for instrument). Furthermore, the model is saturated and as
Wooldridge (2002) points out, in saturated models OLS is a good aproximation when most of
the covariates are discrete, which is our case. Nevertheless, it is well known that OLS has some
problems when the dependant variable is a dummy60 and binary models have been proposed
for these cases. Therefore, we re estimate equation (14) but now using a probit model. Results
for the marginal e¤ects are presented in Table 9 in the appendix and suggest that OLS results
are similar to those obtained with probit. Nevertheless, this kind of non linear transformation
of single index models (i.e. assumes linearity in the group and time e¤ects) like probit has been
criticized of being restrictive (Heckman 1996). Due to this, Athey and Imbens (2006) developed
a non-parametric generalization of di¤erences-in-di¤erences called Changes-in-Changes (CIC ).
The costs of this generalization are twofold: rstly, requires more data due to its non-parametric
nature. Secondly, when the outcome is discrete it is only possible to estimate bounds. Thus, I
left this as a potential extention of the robustness checks.
7.4 Measurement error
The EPS panel used in our study, as every survey data, might be subject of measurement
error. Furthermore, the fact of using self reported employment histories may aggravate the
problem. This is especialy important for hours of work, since on the one hand, measurement
error in this variable could lead to misclassication of individuals into hours groups and thereby
to a dilution of the estimated e¤ect on employment transitions. On the other hand, it will
a¤ect hourly wages, since they are constructed as a combination of monthly wage, weeks and
hours. Finaly, the EPS panel does not have a direct question on overtime which may lead to
misclassication of individuals into hours groups.61 All these measurement error e¤ects will
bias our estimates. Therefore, this section attempts to measure the magnitude of this potential
bias by using sensitivity analysis.
Our rst analysis deals with misclassication coming from the fact that the EPS panel does
not have a direct question of overtime. This would generate a downward bias on our results,
60These problems are: a) the predicted probabilities may lie outside the range [0; 1] :b) non normality of the
error term and c) heteroskedasticity.
61For example, someone who report 48 hours a week of usual hours might imply: (a) 48 normal hours and
zero overtime or (b) 45 hours plus 3 of overtime. This is important since in the rst case the individual will be
classied to the treatment group and in the latter case to the control group.
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giving us a lower bound of the e¤ect of the policy change on employment transitions. To test
how important is this e¤ect and based on CASEN 200062, we observe that the probability of
working overtime is a¤ected mainly by industry category. In particular, workers on minning
and transport sectors have higher probability of working overtime hours. This is in line with
ENCLA 200263 which shows that minning and transport category have the longest workweek.
Therefore, if we do have an important missclasication due to the lack of a direct question
of overtime, we should expect our results to change by excluding workers in the minning and
transport categories, since they should have higher probabilities of misclassication. Results
are presented in Table 10 in the appendix and suggest that estimates do not change when we
exclude workers in the mentioned categories, hence seems to be that missclasication is not a
signicant problem in our case. Furthermore, distributions of usual hours in January 2003 and
January 2005 in gure 3 show high peaks at the legal maximum of standard hours (48 and 45
respectively). Hence, it is likely that responses do not include overtime.
Our second analysis exploits the accuracy of the measure of hours by region. This is because
some regions in Chile have a very high proportion of workers with special distribution of hours,
which are not only concentrated in the minning and transport sectors but also on services
related to them. Antofagasta andAtacama regions concentrate a high proportion of the minning
industry (which has a special distribution of hours), and therefore most of the services there
are related to the minning sector. For example, they can concentrate weekly hours in 4 days of
12 hours each and then 3 day of holidays, or in a more extreme case, employees can work 20
days in a row and then have the proportional resting days, but the average has to be 48 hours
per week (before January 2005, or 45 hours after January 2005).64 This variation of hours may
introduce noise in the measure of weekly hours. Therefore, we exclude these two regions to
obtain better measures of hours. Results seems to be robust to this specication since they
suggest that by excluding noisier regions, in terms of measure of weekly hours, results do not
signicantly vary.
7.5 General equilibrium e¤ects
The e¤ect of a reduction of standard hours on employment transitions has been analized from
a partial equlibrium perspective which basically assumes that individuals not directly a¤ected
62CASEN 2000 (Encuesta de caracterizacion social) is a cross-section data carried out at the end of 2000. It
includes one question about normal (standard) weekly hours agreed with the employer or dened in the contract
and another question on actual weekly hours. Therefore, it is possible to know who is working overtime.
63Encuesta Laboral.
64Observatorio Laboral 7. Septiembre 2002
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by the policy are indeed not a¤ected at all, or in Lees words...."we do not allow for external-
ities of the treatment". This is in line with most of the policy evaluation literature, since it is
a reasonable assumption when policy interventions have small scale (e.g. small training pro-
grammes) and allow researchers to avoid time consuming especication of general equilibrium
models which sometimes require many more assumptions. Nevertheless, when the intervention
has a bigger scale, like changes in regulation (e.g. changes of the minimum wage, cut of stan-
dard hours or massive training programmes among others.) which a¤ect a broader range of the
population, then the support for a partial equilibrium approach weakens.
In our case, a cut of standard hours to 45 per week a¤ected (treated) all workers above
that threshold. If there are externalities to this policy, then it might a¤ect those below the
threshold or those above the threshold but in not a¤ected jobs or those individuals who were
not employed at that time. In the rst case, we check potential e¤ects on individuals below
the threshold when we check the assumption that the policy change do not a¤ect the control
group, and we coud not found any signicant e¤ect. This is supported by the policy change that
explicitly mention that individuals with less (or equal) hours than the new threshold should not
be a¤ected. In the second and third cases, if there are externalities then they should be reected
somehow on earnings (or hourly wages) and therefore should be internalized by the inclusion
of it. Furthermore, if spillovers and substitution e¤ects were important in our case they should
a¤ect our results when the control group range was broadened, which did not happen. Hence,
we do not claim that there are no general equilibrium e¤ects but seems to be that if they exist
it e¤ects should be not highly signicant.
8 Conclusion
Many countries around the world have implemented or discussed worksharing policies like
reductions of the maximum standard weekly hours, usually as a way of decreasing high rates
of unemployment. Despite its popularity, theoretical evidence concludes that the e¤ect of a
reduction of standard hours on employment is ambiguous and therefore remains an empirical
question.
The scarse micro-econometric evidence can be grouped in those studies which analize re-
duction of standard hours derived from collective bargains and those derived from change in
regulation. The rst group usually exploit panel data methods where the dependent variable
is employment and one of the covariates is standard hours. Since standard hours usually are
jointly determined with employment, instruments for standard hours are needed. Therefore,
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these studies relies on the exogeneity of the instruments. An alternative approach has been
the use of an exogenous changes of legislation. Most of the evidence of this approach su¤ers
from simultaneity problems since in general a reduction fo standard hours has been jointly im-
plemented with higher exibility and/or nancial incentives which do not allow to di¤erentiate
the e¤ect of each policy. The only exemptions have been the reduction of 40 to 39 hours in
1982 in France studied by Crepón and Kramarz (2002) and the reduction of 44 to 40 hours in
the Canadian region of Quebec. The problem with both of them is the lack of crucial variables
like hourly wages and/or usual hours.
We exploit a variation of the labour regulation in Chile which includes a reduction of the
maximum standard hours from 48 to 45 hours per week to study the e¤ect of the reduction of
hours on employment transitions. The characteristics of the labour reform allow us to have a
pure reduction of standard hours (i.e. it is not jointly implemented with other policies). Also,
relative to Crepón and Kramarz (2002), the advantage of our data (EPS Panel) is that EPS
Panel includes information related to the employment history of individuals, which includes
hourly wages and usual hours before the implementation of the reduction of hours. A major
issue is the potential anticipation e¤ects due to the fact that there were a pre-announcement
just before the initial period considered in our study. Nevertheless, given the long period of
adjustment established in Chilean legislation this is unlikely. We check the behaviour of crucial
variables to support this hypothesis and all of them suggest no anticipation e¤ects.
Therefore, our contribution is that we tackle the main drawbacks of previous empirical
evidence on the employment e¤ects of a reduction of working hours. This means rstly that
we use a dataset which includes crucial variables like hourly wages and usual hours before the
implementation of the policy change. Secondly, we use a pure reduction of working hours,
i.e. there are no joint policies implemented so we can isolate the pure e¤ect of the reduction
of hours. Thirdly, given the nonanticipation e¤ects we take the policy change as exogenous
eliminating the endogeneity between hours and employment.
Our results suggest no signicant direct e¤ects of the reduction of standard hours on em-
ployment transitions (i.e. no e¤ect on excess job destruction). These e¤ects remain insignicant
when the indirect e¤ect from hourly wages is allowed. These ndings are robust to several spec-
ications. We also nd that individuals a¤ected by the reduction of standard hours work less
hours and get higher hourly wages (i.e. wage compensation). Therefore, the results for Chile
are in line with most of the evidence of European countries and Canada. Our results of non
signicant e¤ect of excess of job destruction and the negligible variation on overall employment
suggest that there is little support for work-sharing policies as a job-creation strategy.
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9 Appendix
Description of the Chilean Labour Reform of December 2001
1. In reference to the separation of workers and layo¤ costs, before the reform there were 3
ways of nishing the contract between a company and an employee:
a) Due to business (or economic) reasons: those include the modernization or rationaliza-
tion of the company, lower productivity, change in the economy or in the market and the
lack of the employeeappropriate skills. By using this way of nishing the contract the
employer has to pay severance payments of 1 month (30 days) per worked year with a
maximum of 11 years.
b) Due to causes that can not be attributable to the employee: among these are the em-
ployees death, agreement between employer and employee, employees resignation, end
of the job or service that originated the contract.
There is no severance payments in this case.
c) Due to causes that can be attributable to the employee: these include damage to the
companys property, violence against a peer and/or superior, skipped some of his/her
contractual duties and so on.
There is no severance payments in this case either.
The reform basically incremented nes when rms invoke the wrong cause for separating an
employee.65The reform also modied the procedures by which severance payments were paid.
This is, before the reform, there were no specications on how indemnizations had to be paid,
so worker and employer could negotiate how to do it. The reform stated that indemnizations
in all the above cases have to be paid at once, when the contract ends or it can be paid in
instalments (including readjustments due to interest). It also states that if severance payments
are not paid as stipulated above, the court can increase them in 150%.
65If the employer can not accredited the causes that originated (a) (in case the employer states (a)) the court
could increment severance payments in 20%. The reform increased this ne to 30%. It also eliminated the lack
of the employeeappropriate skills as a cause of invoking (a), hence if the employer res the employee anyway,
the reform states that the employer has to increase the payment in 50%. Before the reform, in case of wrongly
invoking (b) the court could increment the indemnization in 20%. The reform increased it to 50%. The same
will happens if the company does not specify any of the above alternatives of terminating the contract.
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Finally, the reform incorporated that if the employer res a worker due to practices against
unionization, then this layo¤ will not be e¤ective. Furthermore, the company will have two
options: rstly, reincorporate the red worker or secondly, if the worker does not want to come
back to the company then the employer has to pay the severance payments per year to the
worker plus an additional severance payment equivalent to 3 to 11 months per year worked
depending on the decision by the court.
2. In reference to the exceptional distribution of the working time in some industries, before
the reform of 2001, the Ministry of Labour (by the direct authorization of its Undersec-
retaryship of Labour) allowed the possibility of establishing exceptional distribution of
the working time and leisure di¤erent from the ones allowed by law given the particular
characteristics of the job (this is very important in the mining industry and salmon sh-
eries since those activities are usually located far away from urban centres or have some
peculiarities).
The modication established by the reform is that the authorization given by the Under-
secretaryship of Labour will last only 4 years (so now it has a limit), the same will occur with
the renewals and it also has to be authorized by the employees. If all that happens, then the
Undersecretaryship of Labour mightdo the renewal (i.e. completely discretional).
3. With respect to over time hours, before the reform, overtime hours have to be agreed be-
tween employer and employee with the only requisite that it had to be explicitly specied
in the contract or in a posterior document. The overtime premium was 50% of the hourly
wage. The reform did not change the direct cost of the overtime. The premium remained
at 50% of the hourly wage. Nevertheless, the reform stated that over time hours can only
be agreed for a particular or temporal necessity of the company and that they have to be
specied in a document and the maximum period of the agreement can not be superior
to three months, although it is possible to renew it.
4. In reference to changes on collective barging relationship, the reform made more expensive
the replacement of workers on strike. This is because before the reform employers could
replace workers on strike from the rst day only if the employerlast o¤er ensured the
existing benets adjusted by the ination of the period of the duration of the contract. If
not, then the employer could only replace workers after 15 days of strike. Also, employees
that have to go to strike when the majority of workers decided it could choose to return to
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work after 15 days since the beginning of the strike. The reform added that the employer
can replace workers on strike (as above) but only if it pays them (workers on strike) a
bond of 4 UF66 per replaced worker.
5. In this category we include modications on working privileges, nes that limit the man-
agement of the rm, higher nes and better supervision from the Undersecretaryship of
Labour (with 300 extra labour agents).
a) In reference to working privileges, the reform creates a privilege of 40 days for those
workers who participated on the assembly that generated the union.67
b) With respect to the nes that limit the management of the rm, the reform modies
the law that regulate business management in the sense that it makes it more rigid.
This is because it was added that any alteration made to the legal identity, division
of the company or loosening of individual and collective labour rights (i.e. wage and
indemnization per year of service among the former ones and the right to unionize and
collective barging among the latter ones) will constitute a subterfuge to avoid labour and
pensions obligations(and then a ne like the ones presented in (c) have to be applied).
c) With respect to the increment of nes, before the reform there were nes between 1-10
UTM68 depending on how big the fault was plus 0.15 UTM per worker a¤ected for the
fault (this applies to any fault which does not have a specied ne in any other part of
the law). The reform increased these nes to 1-20 UTM, but if the employer has more
than 50 workers then the ne increases to 2-40 UTM, and if he has more than 200 workers
it will increase to 3-60 UTM.
66UF means Unidades de Fomento. The UF was determined by law in it origins and indexed to the monthly
ination (currently has a value around 21 pounds).
6710 days before the assembly and 30 days after the assembly.
68UTM means Unidades Tributaries Mensuales. Similar to the UF but its value is around 37 pounds (also
indexed by ination).
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Description of Variables
Dependent Variable In our rst especication, the dependent variable (NE) was dened as
a dummy:
(
= 1 if individuals are not employed at the end of the transition period
= 0 if individuals are employed at the end of the transition period
)
for example for the cross section January 2002 - January 2003: NE=1 if, conditional of
being employed in January 2002, individual i is not employed in January 2003 and NE=0 if,
conditional of being employed in January 2002, individual i is employed in January 2003. The
same denition applies for period January 2003 - January 2005.
The denition presented above implies that NE=0 if individual i is still employed in the
next period. This will include all those individuals not a¤ected by non-employment spells
plus those individuals a¤ected by non-employment spells but who got a di¤erent job and are
employed at the the end of the transition period. For example: lets take the period January
2003 - January 2005. All individuals are employed in January 2003, then NE=0 if individuals
are still employed in January 2005. This includes all those who remain in their jobs for the
whole period (January 2003-January 2005) plus those who loose their job at some point and
obtain a new job before January 2005. This latter group should not be consider as not a¤ected
since they indeed loose their job. Due to this, the results presented in section 6 come from the
following especication of the dependent variable:
(NE) is a dummy variable:
8><>:
= 1 if individuals are not employed or
employed in a different job at the end of the transition period
= 0 if individuals are employed in the same job at the end of the transition period
9>=>;
Since we do not have a direct question on tenure, to dene "same job", we generate a
variable tenure=1 if individual i is employed in January 2005 in the same occupation, in the
same industry and in the same region than in January 2003. Results does not change much
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with respect to the previous specication of the dependent variable. Results presented come
from this latter especication.
Covariates
Gender:
dummy variable which is:
(
= 1 if Female
= 0 if Male
)
Age:
Age of individual i.
Schooling:
We construct seven categories (s) based on years of education. These categories are:
s=1 if individual i has no education, pre-school education or kidergarten.
s=2 if individual i has 1-8 years of education (rst level).
s=3 if individual i has special education (handicap).
s=4 if individual i has 9-12 years of education (Scientic-Humanist -second level).
s=5 if individual i has 9-12 years of education (Technical-Professional -second level).
s=6 if individual i has a degree from a Technical-Professional Institute (third level).
s=7 if individual i has a degree from a University (or M.A., Ph.D.) (third level).
then we create one dummy per category.
Region:
We include dummy variables per region. Chile had 13 regions until 2006. Currently there
are 15 regions due to a sub-division of two of the former ones (Region de los Lagos and Region
de Tarapacá). Given that during the period of analysis Chile was experienced the transition
from having 13 regions to 15, we reclassied those who reported any of the two new regions as
part of the respective older regions.
Occupation:
We construct dummy variables per occupation category. We follow the International Stan-
dard Classication of Occupations (ISCO) of the International Labour Organization (ILO).
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These are the major groups:
1. Managers.
2. Professionals.
3. Technicians and associate professionals.
4. Clerical support workers.
5. Service and sales workers.
6. Skilled agricultural, forestry and shery workers.
7. Craft and related trades workers.
8. Plant and machine operators, and assemblers.
9. Elementary occupations.
10. Armed forces occupations
For the purposes of our analysis, we drop the rst two categories and the last one, since
they were not a¤ected by the labour reform, That is why in table 1, occupation only has 7
categories (from 3 until 9).
Industry:
We construct dummy variables per industry category. We follow the International Standard
Classication of Industry.
The major categories are:
1. Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing.
2. Minning and Quarring.
3. Manufacturing.
4. Electricity, Gas and Water supply.
5. Construction.
6. Commerce, Hotels and Restaurants.
7. Transport, Communications
8. Financial Intermediation.
9. Public, Social and Personal Services.
Union:
Dummy variable which is:
(
= 1 if individual i is unionize
= 0 if individual i is not unionize
)
Size of the rm:
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Dummy variables per size category. These categories are:
Size=1 if individual i works in a rm with 1 employee
Size=2 if individual i works in a rm with 2-9 employees
Size=3 if individual i works in a rm with 10-19 employees
Size=4 if individual i works in a rm with 20-49 employees
Size=5 if individual i works in a rm with 50-99 employees
Size=6 if individual i works in a rm with 100-199 employees
Size=7 if individual i works in a rm with 200-499 employees
Size=8 if individual i works in a rm with more than 500 employees
Table 7: Di¤erent denitions of control group
control group dened as (43-45 hours) control group dened as (42-45 hours)
Dependent variable: NEt+p Dependent variable: NEt+p
covariates with covariates without covariates with covariates without
Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard group 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.006
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Overtime goup 0.009 0.012 0.007 0.011
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Observations 5100 5100 5193 5193
control group dened as (41-45 hours) control group dened as (40-45 hours)
Dependent variable: NEt+p Dependent variable: NEt+p
covariates with covariates without covariates with covariates without
Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage)
Standard group 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.013
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
Overtime goup 0.009 0.014 0.011 0.019
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
Observations 5249 5249 5319 5319
Note: control variables include age, dummies for education, occupation, industry, size of the rm, union-
ization status, region, logarithm of hourly wage, one year lagged weekly hours, 2 group dummies (standard and
overtime groups) and the interaction of all the variables with the time dummy. Clustered standard errors at
the individual level are given in parenthesis.
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Table 8: Di¤erent denitions of time periods
A February 2002 - Feb. 2003 - February 2005 March 2002 - March 2003 - March 2005
Dependent variable: NEt+p Dependent variable: NEt+p
covariates with covariates without covariates with covariates without
Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard group 0.004 0.008 0.006 0.010
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Overtime goup 0.008 0.011 0.007 0.009
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 5073 5073 5080 5080
B Second period: January 2003 - January 2004 Second period: January 2004 - January 2005
Dependent variable: NEt+p Dependent variable: NEt+p
covariates with covariates without covariates with covariates without
Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage)
Standard group 0.002 0.005 0.009 0.0014
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Overtime goup 0.004 0.007 0.0012 0.019
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023)
Observations 5085 5085 5082 5082
Note: control varaibles include age, dummies for school, occupation, industry, size of the rm, region
and unionization status, one year lagged weekly hours, group dummies (standard and overtime group) and
interactions of all the previous variables with the time dummy. Cluestered standard errors at the individual
level are given in parenthesis.
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Table 9: Marginal e¤ects of the Probit estimation
Probit
Dependent variable: NEt+p
covariates include covariates do not include
Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage)
(1) (2)
Standard group 0.005 0.011
(0.020) (0.020)
Overtime group 0.009 0.015
(0.023) (0.023)
Observations 5084 5084
Note: control variables include age, dummies for education, occupation, industry, size of the rm, union-
ization status, region, group dummies, logarithm of hourly wage, a one year lagged weekly hours and the
interactions between all previous variables and the time dummy. Clustered standard errors at the individual
level are given in parenthesis.
Table 10: Exclusion of some Industries and Regions
No minning nor Transport sector No Antofagasta nor Atacama regions
Dependent variable: NEt+p Dependent variable: NEt+p
covariates with covariates without covariates with covariates without
Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage) Log(hourly wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standard group 0.007 0.012 0.006 0.010
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Overtime group 0.009 0.014 0.011 0.016
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
observations 4607 4607 4724 4724
Note: covariates include age, dummies for education level (and type), occupation, industry, size of the rm
region, logarithm of hourly wage, group dummies, a one year lagged weekly hours and the interactions of the
previous variables with a time dummy. Clustered standard errors at the individual level are given in parenthesis.
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Figure 2: Employment in a monopsony
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Figure 3: Distribution of usual hours by Gender
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Figure 4: Evolution of usual hours 2002 2006
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Figure 5: Nominal Wage Index and Nominal Labour Cost index (April 2003=100)
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Figure 6: Evolution nominal hourly wage 2002-2006 (Chilean Pesos)
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Figure 7: Evolution of employment rate
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Figure 8: Distribution of treatment and control group individuals by industry category.
Figure 9: Distribution of treatment and control group individuals by occupation category
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Figure 10: Distribution of treatment and control group individuals by size of the rm
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